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CHAPTER I
Origin of the Controversy
On April 15, 1861 President Lincoln issued a proclamation call 
ing for troops for the purpose of "repossessing" the forts in the 
South which had been seized from the Union.^ Two days later, Presl- 
dent Davis of the Confederate States of America by public procla­
mation invited applications for letters of marque and reprisal, 
thereby indicating the Intention of waging war on the high seas 
against the commerce of the United States.2 On April 19 Lincoln, 
acting, he said, "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and 
of the law of nations," issued a proclamation announcing that he 
had "set on foot a blockade" of the Southern ports from South Caro­
lina to Texas, and eight days later he included the coasts of 
North Carolina and Virginia. He declared that any person, acting 
upon the pretended authority of those states, would be held amena­
ble to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punish- 
ment of piracy. The proclamation directed that a vessel approach­
ing or attempting to leave a blockaded port "be duly warned by the 
commander of one of the blockading vessels who will endorse on her 
register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel 
shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port she will 
be captured and sent to the nearest port for such proceedings a- 
gainst her and her cargo as prizes as may be deemed advisable."-^
Until the time of the Issuance of the proclamations by Lincoln 
and Davis, the British government had not decided upon a policy in
regard to the rupture of the Union. Now they were faced with the 
problem of what seemed to them a civil war, and in order to protect 
their citizens from its ravages, a policy had to be determined defin 
itely. Discussion in the House of Lords on April 29, 1861 referred 
to the news of the Civil War, and Malmesbury asked if the govern­
ment had tried to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with 
other powers to check it. Woaehouse speaking for the government 
stated that the United States as an independent nation would have 
resented any suggestion from Great Britain, and that Lyons had been 
instructed to be extremely careful about offering advice unless 
asked for by the contending parties.- On May 1, Dallas learned of 
a plan of Joint action with France, though what action was planned 
was not clear. Dallas further reported that the representatives of 
the Confederacy were in England and that Bussell was not unwilling 
to meet them unofficially, and that there would be some understand 
ing between the British and the French governments. When Bussell 
mentioned the rumor that the southern ports were to be blockaded, 
Dallas informed him that the new minister would arrive in less than 
twro weeks. Bussell replied " The coming of Adams would doubtless 
be regarded as the natural and appropriate occasion for finally dis 
cussing and determining the question."0
On May 3, the Attorney General, replying to a query of Lord 
Bussell in regard to the recognition of belligerency of the South 
and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and re­
prisal, stated that Southern privateering would be dangerous to 
British commerce but that nothing could be done about it. "The 
best solution," said the Attorney Seneral, Bethell, "would be for
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federacies shall be carried on on the principles of 'justum bellum'
and shall be conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of 
Paris. Recognize the Southern States as belligerents on this con­
dition only.”6
The previous day Lord Russell expressed the official position of
the British government when he said in the House of Commons:
"Her Majesty's Government has felt it was its duty to use 
every possible means to avoid taking part in the lamentable 
contest now raging in the American States. Nothing but the 
imperative duty of protecting British interests in case they 
be attacked justifies the government in at all interfering.
We have not been involved in any way in that contest by any 
act or giving any advice in the matter, and for God's sake, 
let us, if possible, keep out of iti"^
On May 6, it was stated that according to precedent the Southern
states must be recognized as belligerents. Russell, quoting the
government policy in 1825, said:
"The character of belligerence was not so much a principle 
as a fact; that a certain degree of force and consistency, 
acquired by any mass of population to be treated as a bel­
ligerent, and, even if the title were questionable, must 
render it the interest well understood of civilized nations 
so to treat them. A power or a community which was at war 
with another, and which covered the sea with its cruisers, 
must either be acknowledged as a belligerent or dealt with 
as a pirate."8
According to those principles the law officers of the Crown came to 
the decision that the Southern states must be granted belligerent
rights.
According to that decision of the law officers, it was announces 
that it was the contemplation of Her Majesty's government to issue 
a proclamation for the purpose of cautioning all her subjects against 
any interference in the hostilities between the Northern and the 
Southern States of America. The general principle of the British
law was that no British subject shall enter into the service of any 
foreign prince or power, or engage in any hostilities that may be 
carried on between any two foreign states.^
On May 10, after pointing out that many seamen would be at­
tracted by the various inducements of privateering, the Earl of 
Derby remarked, "that they should know upon what footing they stand 
with respect to their rights as British subjects. I need not say 
that the offence of entering upon this privateering service is an 
offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act."10
On May 13, the Queen's proclamation of neutrality was official­
ly announced. The discussion in the House of lords on ^ay 16 brings 
out clearly the general consensus of opinion and the policy of the 
government in respect to the proclamation. The South was definitely 
recognized as a belligerent only, and the decision in regard to re­
cognition of independence of the South was to be left to the future. 
The right of the South to send out privateers was recognized as law­
ful, and such privateers could not be regarded as pirates and could 
not be punished as such by the Federal Government. If the Federal 
Government decided to treat them as such in defiance of internation-j- 
al opinion, Great Britain had at least warned her subjects that they 
had no claim to protection if engaged in the service of the South.
A blockade, it was declared, must be effective to be respected, at 
least to the point where a vessel attempting to pass through was 
likely to be captured. The Earl of dllenborough said in the House
of lords that the plan of blockading the entire southern coast was
11on the face of it impossible.
Adams reached London on the evening of May 13, the very day on
which the British Cabinet decided to recognize the Southern states
as belligerents. This did not seem to him to be a very propitious
beginning of his mission. Dallas had been instructed by Seward to
use all proper and necessary measures to prevent recognition of the
insurgents, and after an interview reported to Seward that no action
would be taken before the arrival of Adams. This was understood by
the American Secretary of State as a pledge that no official action
would be taken until that time. Under these circumstances it seemed
to Adams when he learned of the Queen’s Proclamation that the govern
12ment had acted with animus and precipitately. Adams felt that it
was unfriendly and discourteous. This feeling was intensified by
the knowledge that a few days previous, Russell had received the
13Southern commissioners, although "unofficially.” It was on the 
point of undue haste that the criticism of the British government 
■was based and not on their legal right to recognize the belligerency 
of the South. Russell denied that he had made a pledge that no ac­
tion would be taken until Adams arrived to take up official duties.
;Russell insisted that he meant to say that England would not commit 
itself as regards the recognition of the independence of the South­
ern states. 14
In his first interview with Russell, Adams said that it was 
"not without pain" that he was compelled to admit that the opinion 
in Parliament, in the ministry, and in prevailing society showed 
much uncertainty in regard to preserving the friendly relations be­
tween the two nations. He regretted, he said, the decision of the 
|Queen’s Proclamation which raised the insurgents to the level of a 
belligerent state. Russell replied that in question of fact a war
existed and under the circumstances it was impossible to avoid speak­
ing of a 1 justurn helium' and that the intention was to bring the 
management of it within the rule of modern civilized warfare. ^t 
was designed to show the purpose of existing laws and explain to the 
British subjects their liability in case they should enter the war. 
Adams thought that the "action was a little more rapid than was ab­
solutely called for." It pronounced the insurgents to be belliger­
ents before they had shown their capacity to maintain warfare. It 
considered them a marine power before they had a single ship upon 
the ocean.15 Many similar representations containing these same 
arguments were made by Adams and Seward throughout the war and after­
ward.
Seward, writing under the misapprehension of the report of
Dallas, said in his instructions:
"Her Britannic Majesty's government is at liberty to choose 
whether it will retain the friendship of this government by 
refusing all aid and comfort to its enemies, now in flagrant 
rebellion against it, as we think the treaties existing be­
tween the two countries require, or whether her Majesty's 
government will take the precarious benefits of a different 
course."15
After carrying out these instructions Adams was able to report an 
improvement in the attitude of the British government which he 
thought was due to the vigor which was being shown by the national 
government and in part to a realization by the British government 
that their earlier actions had meant more than they intended they
should.17 Henry Adams wrote:
"The English are really on our side; of that I have no 
doubt whatever. But they thought that as a dissolution 
seemed inevitable, and as we seemed to have made up our 
minds to it, that their proclamation was just the thing 
to keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned
out otherwise, they did their best to correct their mistakes ft18
* v> 7
John Bright, an ardent friend of the iforth, thought that the 
method of his government rather than the deed was to be regretted.
It was unfortunate that the Cabinet had taken action since the new 
minister was announced and on his way and that it seemed to be done 
with ’unfriendly haste.” ”It gave comfort and courage to the con­
spiracy.... and caused grief and irritation among.... the people of
America £who are]' desirous of maintaining friendly relations."1  ^
Speaking later in the United States Senate, Sumner distinguished 
between belligerency on land and belligerency on sea, and pointed
out that England created a sea power since no power previously had
20existed on the sea as far as the Southern states were concerned.
The United States government based its contentions on the be­
lief that war did not exist in the international sense. The govern­
ment had not relinquished its sovereignty over the Southern states. 
To them the struggle was carried on by insurgents, and foreign na­
tions did not have the right to take official recognition of them.
In meeting those contentions Russell pointed out that ’’the 
state of things which exists is a state of civil war; and there is, 
as regards neutral nations, no difference between civil and foreign 
wars.”21 Lincoln, it was said, acknowledged the situation of pub­
lic war when he spoke of the blockade "in pursuance of the law of 
nations.” The Supreme Court of the United States declared that the 
president’s proclamation of the blockade itself was "official and 
conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed and 
confirmed as valid all prize and vessels found guilty of violating 
the proclamation.22 Lord Russell thought it quite inappropriate to
speak of "unlawful combinations” when the president was calling for
8400,000 men and 400,000,000 of dollars.^3 Earl Derby said: "The^ 
northern States can not he entitled to claim the rights of belli­
gerents for themselves, and treat the Southern States, not as belli- 
gerents, but as rebels." Later, speaking of the matter in 1865, 
Lord Palmerston said that "the admission of belligerent rights for 
the South was the result rather of necessity than of choice."2^
Recent writers on the subject substantiate this position of 
Palmerston and hold that the recognition of belligerency was "simply 
the natural, direct, and prompt notification to British subjects re­
quired in the presence of a de facto war." C. F. Adams, Jr. came 
to the conclusion in his father's biography that the' issuance of 
the declaration before the arrival of Adams was most fortunate. Eis 
instructions were based on the Lincoln-Seward theory that the for­
eign nations had no concern in the local insurrection. The British 
based their claims on the proclamations of Davis and of Lincoln 
which recognized the de facto war. Adams suggests as a possible 
hypothesis that the protest which Minister Adams planned to make 
would have resulted in an immediate rupture, and that, had England 
delayed this recognition until after the victory of the South at
Bull Run, the consequences might have been the immediate recogni-
2 6tion of the South as an independent state.
The Foreign Enlistment Act which was largely the subject of 
the Queen's proclamation of May 15, 1861 forbade subjects to "be 
concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming of 
any vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall 
be employed in the service" of a belligerent, and provided for
punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if the prohibi­
tion were disobeyed. The act further declared, however, that pun­
ishment or seizure would follow only upon due proof of the offence. 
Bullock, the principal Confederate agent in Europe, had consultedi
eminent English counsel and had been informed that it was no of­
fence under the act merely to build a ship without arming and equip
ping it. This was the construction which had been placed upon the
28act by the British officials and courts. In its program of build­
ing war ships in British ports the Confederate government adopted
a policy which enabled them to conceal the ownership and destina-*
tion of their ships. They were careful to arm these ships and
29equip them outside British waters.
Early in 1862 Adams began protesting to lord Bussell in regard 
to the steamers which were being fitted out in British ports with 
the intention of breaking the Southern blockade. On February 18, 
1862 Adams reported to Bussell as follows: "An armed steamer is be­
ing prepared with evident intention for hostile operations on the 
ocean. From the evidence furnished.... I entertain little doubt 
that the intention is precisely.... the carrying on of war against 
the United States." Adams pointed out that the parties involved
had previously succeeded in running the blockade, and offered to
30procure further evidence if it were needed. Bussell referred the 
letter to the Commissioner of Customs at Liverpool who reported 
that the destination of the vessel was Palermo, that she was not at
27
the time fitted for the reception of guns, that the builders of the 
vessel were not of the opinion that she was to be fitted with guns
whilst she remained in the country, that she was intended for the
Italian government, and that orders had been given to watch the 
movement of the vessel.^ On March 25, Adams pointed out to lord 
Russell that the duty of friendly nations was not to permit their 
good faith to be violated by the ill-disposed persons because "the 
existing municipal laws are found to be insufficient, and do not 
furnish the means of prevention adequate to the emergency."32 To 
Seward, Adams wrote that Russell had been deluded by what he (Adams) 
could not help thinking was "the willful blindness and credulous 
partiality of the British authorities." &e had no confidence that 
application to Russell would! meet with success, but he did so "to 
perpetuate testimony for future use.”^
In a conference with Russell, Adams was informed that the au­
thorities at Liverpool had reported that there was no ground for 
doubting the legality of the voyage of the ship in question. Adams 
replied that this was exactly what gave such unpleasant impressions 
to the people in America. He said:
"The Oreto, by the very papers furnished from the custom­
house, was shown to be laden with a hundred and seventy 
tons of arms, and to have persons called 1 troops * on board,
destined for Palermo and Jamaica.... The factsof her
true destination were notorious all over Liverpool."'3
He said again: "In spite of the admission that troops and guns are
on board, Her Majesty's Government still insist(ed) upon being blind
to the destination of the vessel, and the government tolerates the
abuse.
On June 13, 1862, Adams wrote Russell that it was necessary of 
apprising his lordship that a new and still more powerful war steam­
er was nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the 
same errand as the Oreto, later called the Florida, ^e went on to
11
say that it was being built in the dock-yard ownecTTy BritifiT^suS1^
jects, one of whom was a member of Parliament, and that it was fitted
out with the manifest purpose of carrying on hostilities at sea. It
was to be commanded by the same insurgent agent as sailed in the
Oreto, and that a letter from the agents had been intercepted which
fully explained the situation. He added:
"It is my duty to solicit such action as may tend either 
to stop the projected expedition or to establish the fact 
that its purpose was not inimical to the people of the 
United States."36
Russell referred the matter, to the proper department of Her Majesty' 
government. A report from the custom-house showed nothing to be 
amiss about the vessel. The report further stated that there had 
een no attempt to disguise the fact that the vessel was a ship of 
jwar, that she had neither guns nor carriages, though she did have 
powder canisters. The officers had ascertained that she was built 
for a foreign government. The builders were not disposed to answer 
questions regarding its destination. Beyond this the customs offi­
cers had no other reliable information. Since there was at that 
Itime not sufficient.evidence to warrant detention of the vessel, the 
custom officers would wait for evidence from the consul before tak­
ing further action. Without sufficient evidence to justify them­
selves, the officers who seized the vessel might entail on themselves
rznand their government serious consequences.
In a note to Adams, dated July 12, 1862, Seward wrote as fol-
o
lows:
"Since the Oreto and other gunboats are being received by 
the insurgents from Europe to renew demonstrations on our 
national commerce, Congress is about to authorize the is­
sue of letters of marque and reprisal and that if we find 
it necessary to suppress that piracy, we shall bring
privateers into service„£or that purpose, and of course, for that purpose only."0
Russell acknowledged the protests of Adams from time to time
and assured him that his complaints were being referred to.ithe pro-
40per department of government. In spite of the fact that the fore­
man in Messrs, laird's yard said she was the sister to the gunboat 
Oreto and had been built for the same parties and for the same pur­
pose the officials at Liverpool shut their eyes to facts that were 
41notorious.
On July 16, 1862, Adams received from Collier, the Queen's eoun- 
^sel, an opinion so decided that he (Adams) directed our consul at 
Liverpool to proceed with utmost vigor in the preparation of deposi-
A Otions to place before the collector of customs there.  ^ In this 
first opinion, Collier considered the evidence almost conclusive 
that the vessel in question was intended for the Confederate govern­
ment as a privateer, -“e felt that the matter was so urgent that he 
advised the principal officer of the customs at Liverpool to seize 
the vessel with a view of condemnation, and at the same time to lay 
the facts before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He 
advised immediate action by the commissioner of customs, since the 
government might not unreasonably take some little time to consider
43what course to pursue, and in the meantime the vessel might escape.
On July 23, Collier handed down a second opinion in which he 
said that it was the duty of the collector of customs to detain the 
vessel. He said, "If he allows the vessel to leave Liverpool, he 
will incur heavy responsibility.... It appears difficult to make 
out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Rnlistment Act,
12
13
which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better then a 
4-4-dead letter,”
This opinion with eight affidavits was presented to Lord Rus­
sell on the 26th of July, The most damaging deposition, and the 
only one that was considered conclusive rather than mere hearsay 
evidence, was that of Passmore whose testimony was borne out by 
four other persons. Passmore was a seaman who had been enlisted by 
the southern agent, ^e stated: "that she had a magazine, shot, and 
canister racks on deck, and was pierced for guns, and was built and 
fitted up as a fighting ship in all respects.” The deposition went 
on to prove the connection of the agent of the Confederate govern­
ment, Captain Bullock, with this vessel as superintending her con­
struction. The document closed with these words: "It is well known 
by the hands on board that the vessel is going out as a privateer 
for the Confederate government to act against the United States under 
a commission from ^r. ^efferson Davis."4^
Endless representations followed offering proof of what every­
one knew. Squarey, Dudley's counsel, obtained an interview with 
layard, the Under-Secretary for the Foreign Department, and from a 
report of the conversation which he sent to Adams, it appears that 
he represented the urgency of the case and pressed for a speedy de­
cision.46 Dudley presented strong circumstantial evidence, but the 
customs collector demanded ocular proof, which could not be fur­
nished.47 Adams then sent "another communication to Lord Russell
48so that the refusal to act may be made as marked as possible."
The papers submitted by Adams to Russell were referred b.y the 
latter to the law officers of the Crown. They lay for five days at
&
the home of the Queen's advocate, who had been striken with an
illness from which he never recovered. Other advisers were called
in. On July 29 orders to hold the vessel were telegraphed to liver
pool. It was too late. She order had been anticipated and careful
plans had been laid to evade it. With a party of guests on board
to cover up her real purpose, and under the pretence of making a
trial trip, the Alabama steamed down the Mersey and stood out to
sea. She guests were sent back on a tug, but the Alabama did not
return. She met her consort at a designated rendezvous, where the
Alabama took on stores, arms, and munitions and proceeded on her
49career as a commerce destroyer.
Shough the Alabama was still near the Welsh coast, where she 
remained from 7;S0 P.M. on July 29 to 3 A.L. July 31, upward of 31 
hours, collecting her crew and making ready for her long journey, 
no attempt was put forth by the authorities of the port to reach 
her. "A lamentable proceeding," John Morley called it, "for which 
the want of alacrity and common sense at the Foreign Office and th^
bias or blundering of the customs agents at Liverpool may divide
*50the grave discredit."
ilussell himself recoiled as he contemplated the consequences of 
the course in permitting this vessel to escape. With the support 
of the Puke of Argyll, he had drawn up a despatch directing colon­
ial authorities to detain the ship if she came within their reach. 
When the subject was brought before the cabinet, all the others
C "lwere against it. The measure had to be abandoned."There was 
a perfect insurrection," wrote Lord Russell.
The friends of the Union strongly condemned the negligence of
15
the customs authorities and the government. Baring in the House of 
Commons said, "The law officers had been dilatory. It was unfor­
tunate that the government.... should he so badly represented by 
those whose duty it was to carry those laws into effect that the 
customs authorities were not aware what was going on." rxe contended
that the vessel would have been seized if the proper precautions 
52had been taken. One point on which information was required, 
Forster said:
"Was as to the steps the customs authorities had taken to 
find out the truth or falsehood of the American minister's 
statements... The House ought to know how it was that the 
customs authorities, whose duty it was to prevent the breach 
of the law, independently of the Foreign Office and the 
American government, took no steps in the matter."
He pressed further accusations against the officials. He said: They
"were acting in some respects on the wrong principle; for they
seemed to suppose that it was not their business to put it (the
Foreign Enlistment Act) in force until the American government took
53action in the matter." He saw the question- not as a matter of 
sympathy as between the Horth and the South. J"Le held that :"It was 
a question of obedience to a British law, and carrying out a Brit­
ish act, the preamble of which said that the equipping or fitting 
out of vessels in British ports was to be prevented because it was 
prejudicial and calculated to endanger the peace and welfare of 
the kingdom."^4 He said further:
"It appears that the representations of the American 
minister had merely the effect of warning the owner 
that it was necessary that she should sail at once.
It certainly is a curious coincidence that the day 
that the opinion of the law officers was received was 
the very day that the vessel got away.... notwithstand­
ing the suspicions attached to her, the customs author­
ities did not find out that this pleasure excursion was 
her actual departure."55
Forster concluded by expressing the hope that: "surely the govern­
ment would do their utmost to preserve the neutrality from being 
violated by private interests in order to put money into the pockets 
of a few ship-owners and contractors, however wealthy they may be or 
however high their stations."*^ Cobden wrote to Gladstone that "the 
spirit of pride and self-sufficiency of the merchant classes" was
CMresponsible for the Alabama's escape.°
The ministers defended themselves on the grounds that there had 
not been sufficient evidence; that no arrests could be made on mere 
suspicion and accusations of a foreign minister. In the debate they 
evaded the real issue and hid behind the question of selling muni­
tions and enlistment of men. The North was really obtaining more 
assistance of this nature than the South did, they said. Grounds 
for complaint, they went on, would exist only if the government it­
self were concerned in fitting out such a belligerent ship, or if
the government permitted the belligerent to carry on operations on
58their shores and in their waters. Bussell officially disclaimed
for the British government any responsibility for the escape, but
he wrote to Lyons: "I must feel that her roaming the ocean with
English ships and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the
ships of a friendly nation is a scandal and a reproach."0 Russell
said in the debate: "A learned judge has said that we might drive,
not a coach and six, but a whole fleet oi ships tnrough that act
of Parliament," and he thought that the lav; ought to be made more
clear and intelligible.60 But again he writes that the law is suf-
61ficient if legal evidence can be obtained.
17
The escape of the Alabama encouraged the Confederate agents. 
The road seemed clear for building an unlimited number of ships in 
the British shipyards.
Shortly before the Alabama left the port of Liverpool, Bullock
had contracted with the Lairds at Birkenhead for two ironclad ships-
of-war to be built; and by the middle of July the work on both ships
was begun. 6  ^ These vessels v/ere of the most advanced design of the
times, and equipped with steel rams which were clearly designed to
break the blockade. They caused great consternation at Washington.
The assistant secretary of the IJavy wrote to Adams: "You must stop
them [the Laird ramsj at all hazards as we have no defense against
63them....  It is a question of life and death.” .
Shortly after the news was received at Washington that these 
iron-clad rams were being planned, a bill was introduced into Con­
gress authorizing the president to issue letters of marque and re­
prisal. This occurred in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward 
wrote to Adams of the proposed measures, specifying that the purpose 
was to permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the 
Alabama and other vessels of a like type. He characterized tjiis as 
a plan "to organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of 
marque and reprisal.'*64 Though the bill was introduced in the sum­
mer of 1862, it was not taken seriously until February, 1863.
In the Senate discussion of the bill at the time of introduc- 
tion, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to 
encourage privateers to pursue British ships when they should "turn 
Confederate." It would give the president the power to protect the 
nation against "insolence of a foreign power." Sumner objected
18
that the true business of privateers was to destroy enemy commerce 
and the South had no such commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his 
opinion also, but explained that the administration wanted the meas­
ure passed so that it might have in its hands a power to be used if 
the need arose. The majority of the Senate was opposed to taking 
action at this time and the matter was permitted to lapse, but with­
out definite action, so that it could be called up again at any 
65time. The bill again came before the Senate in January 1863, was
referred to the committee, reported out, and passed on February 17.
The House of Representatives passed the bill without debate. Grimes
now clearly expressed the need for the bill because the Confederates
"are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to break
our blockade of their coast" and that privateers were to assist in
6 6maintaining the blockade.
In the cabinet, opinion was divided on the question of issuing 
letters of marque and reprisal. Seward and Chase were in favor of 
it, but Welles was strongly opposed since he feared that it would 
involve us in war with England. Seward later presented two messages 
from Russell which Welles said were "insolent, contemptuous, and 
meant agression if not war," and he was inclined to believe that 
the letters of marque would be useful as an admonition to England.
lord Lyons feared that the measure would be misapprehended 
abroad. Seward's letter to Adams explaining the nature of the bill 
was vague. He said that the executive would have discretion in put­
ting the act in force, and there would be entire frankness to 
"avoid any surprise on the part of friendly nations whose commerceft 68might be incidentally and indirectly affected."
Lyons pointed out to Seward the bad effect which the applica- I 
tion of the act would have upon Europe. Seward replied: "i ome 
remedy must be found for the fact that"} the law did not appear to 
enable the British government to prevent” the issue of Confederate 
privateers from their ports and added that the departure of any 
more armed vessels from English ports was a thing to be deprecated 
above all things.69
On March 8, Seward sent Lyons a letter in which he pointed out 
that peace oould not be preserved without the best intention on the 
part of the British government to enforce its laws. Lyons protes­
ted vigorously to the letters of marque and implied that war would 
result. Seward replied that he was aware of the inconvenience and 
danger resulting from the act, and that he would be glad to delay 
using it; but '’that unless some intelligence came from England to
70allay the public exasperation, the measure would be unavoidable.” 
Lyons was much alarmed. Seward informed him of instructions 
which had been sent to Adams to inform Russell of the delicacy of 
the situation, and to ask for assurance that no further vessels 
would escape from British ports. The privateering bill would be
put in force unless such escapes could be prevented by the British
71neutrality act.
In the early months of 1863, matters were rapidly coming to a 
head in both America and England. The question of the letters of 
marque was before the American cabinet, and nfelles, who had previous­
ly opposed the measure, was affected by the unfavorable reports re­
garding the intentions of Great Britain. It was decided to post-
72pone action until further information was received from England.
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The newspapers encouraged by Seward were fanning excitement to a
V1 73 blaze.
In England a feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the 
ministry had been lax in regard to the Alabama. Merchants were com­
ing to realize that their interests were opposed to those of the 
ship-builders. Meetings were held and the matter was vigorously 
discussed. Resolutions were passed which condemned the allowed 
building and fitting out of vessels-of-war in English ports.74
Adams noted a friendlier feeling in a speech which lord Russell
made in Parliament on March 23, and reported "that it was the most
satisfactory of all the speeches he has made since I have been at 
75this post." Russell further advised Palmerston that he might safe­
ly say in the coming debate that "the government disapprove all such 
attempts to elude our law with a view to assist one of the belligeri- 
ents."76 Adams reported that the government was really better dis­
posed to exertion, and seemed better sustained for action by public
77sentiment than ever before. At this time Russell wrote to Lyons:
"I must feel that her £the Alabama} roaming the ocean with English 
guns and English sailors to burn, sink, and destroy, the ships of a 
friendly nation is. a scandal and a reproach."7®
Cobden wrote:
"I have every reason to know that our government fully 
appreciates the gravity of this matter, lord Russell, 
whatever may be the tone of his despatches, is sincerely 
alive to the necessity of putting an end to the equipping 
of ships-of-war in our harbours to be used against the^
Federal government by the Confederates. He was bona fide 
in his desire to prevent the Alabama from leaving; but he 
was tricked and was angry at the escape of that vessel."
On April 2, 1863 Cobden again wrote to Sumner saying that he had
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urged Russell to be more than passive in enforcing the law. It was 
suspected that some ships supposed to be for the Chinese government 
were really for the Confederates. Cobden urged Russell to investi­
gate. Russell had replied that he had already done so and Cobden 
seemed satisfied. ^  Cobden wrote: "[England^] now begins to under­
stand that she has acted illegally in applauding those who furnished81ships-of-war to prey on your commerce. IJb will not hapjien again."
On March 27, 1865, the merits of the Foreign Enlistment Act 
were debated in Parliament. Forster, who led the debate, brought 
forth two questions for consideration; first, "whether Her Majesty's 
government had done everything it could to prevent these breaches 
of the law;" and second, "whether they were impressed with the neces 
sity of the duty of doing their utmost to prevent them in the fu­
ture." He called on the ministers to explain the violation of the 
Foreign Enlistment Act and to offer some pledge for the future. He 
asserted that the government should have acted on its own initiative 
and hinted at complicity in the escape of the Alabama. These vigor­
ous attacks were carried on against the government by Bright and 
Baring. Instead of making the favorable reply which had been ad­
vised by Russell and expected by Adams, Palmerston was forced to 
defend the government and asserted the correctness of the govern­
mental procedure. The act was held sufficient in itself, he said, 
but direct evidence was not always obtainable. Ho pledge was made 
for the future.^
Adams was disappointed by the results of the debate. In re­
porting to Seward he said he regretted "that the substance of it
83should fall so short of what I had been led to expect."
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The defects of the Foreign Enlistment Act being apparent, Adams 
tvas directed to ask the British minister to provide the required 
remedy by act of parliament, but this he refused to do. Russell said 
in reply: "Mr. Adams said that his government would listen to any 
proposition Eer Majesty's government had to make, but they did not 
see how their own law on the subject could be improved. I said that 
the cabinet had come to a similar conclusion.”®^ "With respect to 
the law itself,” replied Adams, "either it was sufficient for the 
purpose of neutrality, and then let the British government enforce 
it; or it was insufficient, and then let the British government ap­
ply to Parliament to amend it." Russell answered that the law was 
sufficient but the evidence was not always to be procured.88
It was learned that other warships were being built. Adams was 
instructed to attempt by judicial proceedings to arrest the departure 
of the vessels. Evarts was sent to England to confer with Adams in 
the matter. The British government decided to detain the Alexandra 
and to order prosecution of the persons concerned, although, as Adams
said, the ministry would have to breast a good deal of opposition ar
. 8 6subject themselves to heavy responsibilities if they should fail.
That the Alexandra was being built with a view to warlike equip­
ment was beyond doubt, and it was a moral certainty that she was xor 
use in the Confederate service. In instructing the jury, the Lord 
Chief Baron stated that the act was not designed for the protection 
of belligerent powers or to prevent Great Britain being made the oa$e 
of naval operations.87 The purpose of the act was solely to prevent 
hostile jjaval encounters in British waters; and that it forbade equip­
ment merely to prevent immediate hostile operations. The judge fur­
23
ther instructed the jury that a neutral might make a vessel and arm 
it, and then offer it for sale to a belligerent, and so also he 
might execute an order for it. A belligerent might buy muskets, can­
non, gunpowder or ammunition, so why should ships be an exception? 
Under such an interpretation of the statute the jury rendered a ver­
dict for the defendants. The government promptly appealed the 
decision.88
Bussell hoped the orders given to watch and stop vessels appar
ently intended for the Confederate service would allay the strong
feelings which had arisen in the United States by the escape from
89justice of the Oreto and the Alabama.
Adams concluded that the construction placed upon the Foreign 
Enlistment Act left nothing of it as a penal measure; even though 
the ship would remain under interdict, and there would be no relax­
ation of the efforts on the part of the government to check the pro-
90gress of the steamers yet building.
On July 11, Seward sent a despatch to Adams in which he ex­
pressed satisfaction that the British government had seen fit to at­
tempt to stop the fitting out of armed vessels to prey upon the com­
merce of the United States. He went on to say that it was now under­
stood in this country that there was no law in Great Britain which 
would be effective to stop the outrages. He suggested that the 
statute be revised. If this were not done, he said:
** There would be left for the United States no alternative 
but to protect themselves and their commerce against armed 
cruisers.....and to insist upon indemnities.... To this 
end this government is now preparing a naval force with 
the utmost vigor; and if the national navy shall not be 
sufficient.....the United States must bring into employ­
ment such private armed naval forces as the mercantile
marine shall afford. it 91
was a strong despatch, but Adams, exercising his disoret ion.
did not communicate the threat directly to Russell. Since there 
was no enemy commerce, Seward could only mean to use the privateers 
as a cruising squadron. He did find opportunity to say to the Duke 
of Argyle, who was a member of the cabinet, that the situation was
"grave and critical,” and that his instructions were far more string-
92ent than any he had yet received.
Throughout July and August the correspondence on the rams con­
tinued with Dudley and Adams sending evidence and depositions to 
Russell. Twice Adams had supplied to the law officers of the Grown 
what he believed sufficient evidence to justify the seizure of the 
vessels, but received replies that this was no evidence capable of 
being presented to a court of justice. Adams remonstrated and said: 
"A war has thus been practically conducted by a portion of her 
people against a Government with which Her Majesty is under the
most solemn of all national engagements to preserve a lasting and 
durable peace."9®
Adams was becoming uneasy, for he felt that the law-officers
were wavering on the point of evidence in regard to intent, which
Adams thought conclusive. The doubt in the mind of the officers was
94as to the point of destination which was skilfully concealed.
The building continued, and the second ram was launched. Adams 
reported on September 3, that the first was so far prepared for de­
parture as to bring the question of stopping her to a point calling 
for prompt decision.95 Russell sent a note saying that the informa­
tion contained in the depositions was mere hearsay, that the ships 
were for Bravay of France, that the depositions did not prove any 
infraction of the law, but that careful watch would be kept over
th.m-96_________ __________________________________________
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Adams then replied that both countries would be placed in a 
grave situation if an act of aggression were committed against the 
government and the people of the United States by either of these
q nformidable vessels.
On September 5, 1863 Seward wrote to Adams: "The nation, after 
two years of experience in war has overcome the sense of fear, while 
its temper is highly excited. It believes that, though found unpre­
pared, there are no limits to its ultimate ability to defend it­
self."98
On the same day Adams replied to Russell’s note of the previous 
day. It contained plain prophecy of an early rupture of friendly 
relations between the two countries. He said that no nation retain­
ing a proper degree of self respect could tamely submit to such in­
dignities and added the ambiguous statement, "It would be superflu-
99ous in me to point out to your lordship that tliis is war."
In the meantime, however, unknown to Adams, the decision had 
been reached by the government to detain the rams. On the third, 
Layard wrote to the treasury department desiring that they should 
be stopped. On the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston: "The con­
duct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the ironclads at Birki* 
enhead is so suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct 
that they be detained."100 While the decision was reached on the 
third, the matter was still under correspondence with the Lairds 
until the eighth, the government attempting to get conclusive evi­
dence regarding the ownership of the vessel.181 The Solicitor- 
General concurred in the action as one of policy, though not of 
strict law. The two ironclads were finally purchased by the
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government.
Thus was the crisis in this controversy during the Civil War
passed. Benjamin, Secretary of State for the Confederacy, grudgingly
paid Seward this compliment:
"It is impossible not to admire the sagacity with which 
Mr. Seward penetrated into the secret feelings of the 
British Cabinet, and the success of his policy of in­
timidation which the world at large supposed would be 
met with prompt resentment, but which he with deeper in­
sight into the real policy of that Cabinet foresaw woul&n? 
be followed by submissive acquiescence in his demands."10*
To a great extent the success was due to the tact and diplomacy of 
Charles Francis Adams. The change in the foreign policy of Great 
Britain during the Civil War was due to several factors. Affairs 
in Europe were far from reassuring. The feelings of Great Britain 
were deeply enlisted on the behalf of Denmark as against the com­
bined force of Austria and Prussia. This, no doubt, had its weight 
in the American controversy. The Post wrote:
"We may be at war ourselves; we have a future to which to 
look forward, and we must keep in mind the precept which 
inculcates the necessity of doing to others as we would
be done by...... Ship-owners of Liverpool are considering
what is to become of their property should we unhappily 
become involved in war, and innumerable Alabamas issue 
from neutral ports to prey upon British commerce."103
Cobden in a letter to Gladstone pointed out what the consequences
would be if "by entering a war with a maritime power we give American
Lairds an opportunity of supplying a belligerent with Alabamas to
prey on our commerce which they will certainly do."10^ He wrote in
a similar vein to M. Arles Dufour.105 In Parliament, Lefevre said:
"Only the other day when were supposed to be on the verge of a war 
with German, (I) saw it stated in the papers that some of the German 
States..... were prepared to adopt the principle of the Alabama and
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to fit our privateers in neutral ports.
Public opinion was gradually turning in favor of the United
States, especially after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued.
This is shown by the memorials and resolutions sent to Parliament
107and to the American minister.
Recent successes on the battlefront helped to shape the opinion
of governmental ministers. John Bright observed: "Attorney-general
and lord Palmerston spoke in language very different from that used
last year. As the United States government shows signs of strength
and of coming success, so our government becomes more civil. Their
conduct is guided by some other principle than that of honour and
magnanimity. 08 Cobden wrote:
"lord Robert Cecil said, rather smartly, that our Foreign 
Office had a tariff of manners for other countries, regu­
lated according to their power. He might have added that 
we have a different manner for the same Power, according 
as it may be weak or strong. It is only because the North 
has had great successes since July that the British lion 
is becoming so lamb-like towards it.,,1U9
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CHAPTER II
Early negotiations in the Controversy
Claims against Great Britain for the destruction of American 
commerce were presented by Adams to the British Foreign Office as 
they arose.1 Adams was instructed to obtain two effects in his 
early negotiations: "first, due redress for the national and pri­
vate injuries sustained; and, secondly, a prevention of such law­
less and injurious proceedings hereafter.1,2 It was not the inten­
tion of the United States to harass Great Britain with repeated de­
mands for immediate reparation, but it was evident that such fla­
grant cases as that of the Alabama could not be left to be allowed 
to pass without vigorous and continued protest.^ To our repeated 
claims Russell replied that, "much as Her Majesty’s government de­
sire to prevent such occurrences, they are unable to go beyond the 
law, municipal and international."4
Although Russell disclaimed all responsibility for damages, 
Adams continued to present them, and he reported to Seward that
"Lord Russell is becoming a little sensitive to the multiplication
5of the claims for damage done by the Alabama." Indeed, Russell
had previously expressed his hope that Adams "may not be instructed
again to put forward claims which Her Majesty’s government cannot
0
admit to be founded on any ground of law or justice."
Seward declined to cease presenting further claims, saying, 
however, "that the United States does not intend to act dogmatically
or in a litigious spirit.... This government confesses very freely
34
that it does not regard the present hour as one that is entirely 
favorable to a calm and oandid examination of the facts and prin­
ciples involved.” Nevertheless it looked forward to the period 
when the interests and passions aroused by the war have subsided anc. 
disappeared. He insisted on a policy of presenting claims for fu­
ture use, if for no other purpose. The government of the UnitedI
States declared itself disposed at all times to consider all the'
evidence and the arguments; and Seward said; "There is no fair and 
equitable form of Conventional arbitration or reference to which 
they will not be willing to submit.”  ^ This is the first tentative 
proposal for arbitration made on the part of the United States to 
the British government. It was offered as a suggestion to be taken 
into consideration at some future period. It was made in October 
1863, and no further reference was made to it until two years later.
At the close of the Civil War public opinion in the United 
States was in favor of forcing some kind of a settlement and was 
not at all disposed to be conciliatory or even reasonable. There 
were two other subjects of dispute, antedating the Civil War, w'hich 
were to be adjusted if cordial relations were to be preserved. One 
was the San Juan water boundary between the island of "Vancouver and 
the mainland, which had been described in indefinite terms in the 
treaty of 1846, and upon which no agreement had since been reached.
The question at issue was whether the boundary should be the chan-0
nel to the east or that to the west of San Juan Island.
The other question arose out of the decision of the United 
States to terminate the Canadian reciprocity and xtisixexies uonven- , 
tion of 1854. The twelve months’ notice required by the terms of
35
the convention was given to England on Larch 17, 1865, The treaty 
was never regarded with favor, hut the main impulse to the denuncia-'
tion of it seems to spring from the general hostility to England.
r
A threat was made by Seward to terminate the Rush-3agot agree­
ment of 1817 establishing disarmament on the Great lakes, but the
gdemand was not pushed.
On Lay 20, 1865, Adams sent a note to -bus8ell in which he 
maintained that British recognition of the insurgents was precipi­
tate and unprecedented; that the effect of the act of recognition 
was to create belligerency on the part of the Southern states in­
stead of acknowledging an existing fact, and he said that the ap­
pearance of the ocean belligerency on the part of the insurgents 
was in the shape of British built, equipped, and British manned 
vessels. He went on to say that the ministers, while they desired 
to check the abuses, refused to procure the additional power which 
would enable them to do so; that property belonging to the people 
of the United States had been destroyed as a result of the inaction 
of the British government; that the commercial marine of the United 
States had been driven from the sea; and that injuries were of so 
grave a nature as to constitute a valid claim for reparation and 
indemnification.^
Russell maintained that he could not admit that the duties 
of Great Britain toward the United States were to be measured by 
the losses which the trade and commerce of the United States may 
have sustained. ’The question is,” he wrote, "whether in difficult 
and extraordinary circumstances the government of her Majesty have
3(i
performed faithfully and honestly the duties” which international 
law and their own municipal law impose upon them. He maintained 
that the United States government by the blockade had recognized 
belligerency first, and that the British government had performed 
its duty in the case of the Alabama.11
On August 30, 1865, when the war was over, Russell felt that 
"the time was favorable for a calm and candid examination of the 
facts and principles involved." He, therefore, recalled to Adams 
that the United States had expressed itself in favor of any "fair 
and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference." In 
referring to this proposal, he said that there were but two ques­
tions by which the claim for compensation could be tested: The one 
is, Have the British government acted with due diligence, or in 
other words, in good faith and honesty, in the maintenance of the 
neutrality they proclaimed? The other is, Have the law officers of 
the 'crown properly understood the foreign enlistment act? Russell 
went on to say:
"Neither of these questions could be put to a foreign 
government with any regard to the dignity and charac­
ter of the British Crown and the British nation. Her 
Majesty’s government are the sole guardians of their 
honor. They can not admit that they have acted with 
bad faith in maintaining the neutrality they professed.The law officers of the Crown must be held to be better 
interpreters of a British statute than any foreign gov­
ernment can be presumed to be. Her Majesty’s govern­
ment must therefore decline either to make reparation 
and compensation for the captures made by the Alabama 
or to refer the question to a foreign state."
He added the conciliatory if rather ambiguous statement: "Her Majes­
ty's government, however, are ready to consent to the appointment 
of a commission, to which shall be referred all claims arising dur­
ing the late civil war, which the two powers shall agree to refer
3 4
to the commission."xc
The correspondence was at once published in the gazette. and 
the Times in commenting editorially on it admitted the desirability 
of a settlement, and construed the proposal of a commission as de­
signed to embrace the Alabama claims. On the day following this
editorial, there appeared an official correction in the Times, and
13in which the correctness of this implication was denied.
Adams construed the note of Russell as declining the proposal 
of arbitration, but thought that his government would be willing to
consent to the appointment of a joint commission to settle the
. . 14claims.
Seward accepted Russell's statement as implying that the 
Alabama claims were among those which the British government would 
not be willing to refer to such a joint commission. On this con­
struction of the offer Seward declined it, but directed Adams to 
inquire whether this interpretation of Russell's note was correct. 
Assuming that it was, he authorized Adams to say that "what ever 
may have heretofore been or might now have been thought by us of 
umpirage between the two powers, no such proposition for arbitra­
tion of the existing differences will henceforward be insisted upon 
or submitted by this government." ^e added: "This government may 
reasonably be expected to avail itself of the advantages, ix any,1  r
which have resulted from a change of circumstances."
Russell cleared up any doubt about the meaning of his offer 
when he wrote that the arbitration of the claims in the cases of 
the Alabama and other vessels ?;ould be inconsistent with the stand 
Her majesty's government had always taken in the matter. m e
3d
government would not be responsible for acts committed outside her
jurisdiction.16 Now Seward definitely declined the offer to create
a joint commission since the claims for the depredations of the
17Alabama would not be referred by Great Britain.
Russell was replaced by Clarendon in the Foreign Office in 
the autumn of 1865. Diplomatic exchanges proceeded without bringing 
the question nearer to a settlement. Clarendon closed the corres­
pondence with the observation:
"No armed vessel departed during the war from a British 
port to cruise against the commerce of the United States;
....the British government have steadily and honestly
discharged all the duties incumbent on them as a neutral 
power, and have never deviated from the obligations im­
posed upon them by international law.
The Fenian Movement which had for its object the establish­
ment of an independent republic in Ireland added fuel to the hostil­
ity against England. The movement received enthusiastic support 
from the Irish population in the United States who took advantage of 
the widespread hostility to England to further their cause. Fenian 
conventions were held and a general convention even went so far as 
to elect a president for the Irish Republic. Raids were made into 
Canada by the Fenians. The United States government under the lead­
ership of President Johnson took action to quell these enterprises, 
and received from the British government warmest acknowledgment of 
their promptness and sincerity in suppressing these measures. At 
the same time many Irishmen, who had been naturalized in the United 
States, returned to their native land to participate in the Fenian 
movement there, and often times got themselves into trouble vith the 
British government. They were treated by the British government as
Br----------- ------------------------------------
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British subjects since the principle of expatriation was not recog­
nized by that country. Many Irishmen who had become American citi-
19zens were imprisoned and tried for high crimes and misdemeanors.
The politicians in this country did not hesitate to take advan 
tage of the situation to get votes for themselves and their party. 
The Fenians felt aggrieved at the Government's attitude toward the 
raids into Canada. The Canadian and the British governments refuse 
to release the prisoners, and it seemed to the Fenians that the 
American consuls were failing to maintain the rights of American 
citizens. They felt, too, that the attitude of Adams was very il­
liberal. The Radical opponents of the Johnson administration en­
couraged this dissatisfaction and ingratiated themselves with the 
Fenians.
Shortly before Congress adjourned in 1866, two resolutions wer 
passed under the leadership of the Radicals. One requested the 
President to "urge upon the Canadian authorities and also the Bri­
tish Government the release of Fenian prisoners recently captured 
in Canada." The second urged Johnson "to cause the prosecutions 
instituted in the United States courts (against the Fenians) to be 
discontinued.
Rear the close of the same session, the Fenians wanted to rent 
a public building in Washington to hold a meeting. This privilege 
was denied them by the mayor of the city. A resolution was intro­
duced by Wilson of Massachusetts from the Committee of Military 
Affairs which would authorize the use of the building for the 
Fenians. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland alone spoke against the reso­
lution. He said the resolution would support people whose avowed
d
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purpose was to make war against Great Britain. He insisted that
our neutrality laws should be enforced. He indicated the motives
of the supporters of the resolution when he said:
"Politicians who suppose or act as if they supposed 
that mere party is patriotism, who think....that tem­
porary success is permanent fame, may lend themselves 
to encourage lawless proceedings, and may be found pro­
fessing friendship for and alluring on an impulsive^ 
class who, smarting under the injustice they honestly 
believe has been done them and their ancestors in their 
native land, are tempted to violate our laws or disre­
gard our national duty in order to obtain voters at a coming election."21
He thought that England would soon wake up to her default in pre­
serving her neutrality and repair all the consequent damages.
Nye of Nevada replied that England had never shown any such 
magnanimity towards the United States, but had been exercising a 
defiant and impudent attitude. &e said he clearly sympathized with 
the Irish struggle for freedom. He pointed out that the Fenians 
were joining the ranks of the Republicans since they discovered 
they had linked their political destinies on the wrong car. Howe 
of Wisconsin paid high compliments to the Irish character and pat­
riotism. "Freedom," he said, "must be as dear a thing in Ireland 
as in America or elsewhere.... No man who loves equity and justice 
and fair dealing can fail to sympathize with Ireland and those who 
struggle for it." Wilson of Massachusetts said he never had any 
affection for England nor was ever awed by her splendor or charmed 
by her power. He said he felt the government had erred in enforcing 
the neutrality laws in the movement in Canada. Stewart of uevada 
thought the time had come to take some action in Congress as expres­
sive of the sentiment of the nation and show sympathy with the Irish
THlrheT'irh
rather than with Great Britain which had tr®ate^u^so^adly!!?^cEr 
resolution was passed hy a vote of twenty yea; seven nay.
Robinson of Hew York made his appeal to the Irish vote by at­
tempting to show that Adams had been lax in maintaining the rights 
of American citizens abroad. He went so far as to move impeachment
Przproceedings against Adams. °
In the cabinet, Stanton tried to enlist the Irish element
against the administration on the Fenian question by having Seward
issue a proclamation which should have come from the 'tfar Department.
24Stanton wanted to do nothing against the Fenians.
The deep sense of wrong in the minds of people in the United 
States found further expression by resolutions introduced by Chand­
ler of Michigan. In December 1864 he introduced a resolution to
25list the damages and demand that they be paid with interest. He 
said, "Ho nation was ever so well prepared to demand compensation
at the cannon's mouth as we.... I meant that these claims be paid
and promptly paid, paid in full, and if they were not paid, the 
worse for the British government."2  ^ In 1866 he said, "Great Britain 
has declined to pay such bills. She has decided that henceforth the 
rule of war shall be the torch— that the torch is to be evidence of 
neutrality. If she desires that in all future time, whenever she be 
at war, American citizens shall send forth fast sailing steamers 
with the torch to illuminate the seas with British commerce, so be 
it."27 He then presented a resolution to withdraw our minister from 
London and issue a proclamation of non-intercourse, -tie thought that 
if the resolution passed, the bill would be paid in thirty days. In 
July 1866 he offered another resolution to repeal our neutrality
I* 42
laws beoause he thought they were a farce as they stand. These 
resolutions would have required unanimous consent to be considered. 
Since they were objected to by Johnson and Sumner, they were tabled 
and not heard of again in Congress.2®
In Hovember 1867, Chandler presented a resolution to "maintain 
strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between Great Britain
and Abyssinia, granting to .... each belligerent the same rights
and privileges upon land and water."29 He said he introduced this 
to retaliate for the treatment Great Britain offered us during the 
Civil War. He made a list of claims when the resolution was pre- 
sented and said that England must abandon the continent to satisfy 
our wrongs. He made clear that the resolution was no joke as some 
in the Senate and the press seemed to think. This remark brought 
forth a brief debate. Anthony of Rhode Island agreed that we had 
suffered great wrongs. He explained that our rapid growth had made 
England jealous and that she wanted to destroy her competitor. He 
thought we should interpret the law as she had interpreted it. Our 
country, he said, should be developed and made attractive to capita., 
and labor by building up our factories. This he thought would pun­
ish England. Uye said that a little lesson would not be lost on 
England. She had caused us much suffering, He criticized Sumner 
for not reporting resolutions on the matter from his committee. 
Reverdy Johnson said he could see no good that could come out of 
the resolution. He said it w'ould involve us in a war with England. 
He agreed that England was wrong, but he thought the claims should
be arbitrated. Sumner said the resolution was premature, and sue-
ceeded in having it tabled. 30
s
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to modify our neutrality act of 1818. The bill was reported by Ban
“rom the Foreign delations Committee. He said the object of the bil
was to soale the neutrality act of this country to the standard of
the Foreign Enlistment Act of Great Britain. The bill proposed to
repeal the provision of our previous law which prohibited the fitting
out of ves els without the jurisdiction of the United States. It
also proposed to repeal the section which prohibited the setting on
foot expeditions against a foreign power. This latter provision wasi
clearly made to favor Fenianism. ^rth of Indiana supported Banks.
He said that the existing law placed restraint upon our citizens
which no other country placed on theirs. He said also, "We but fol-
31ow the precedent she Great Britain set us." Conkling was in 
avor of a new law. ^e said that our painstaking foreign policy hacj. 
never been reciprocated by other countries. Hatterson of 11 ew Hamp­
shire and Raymond of Hew Y0rk thought that the act needed careful 
consideration. Raymond proposed a joint committee of the House and 
he Senate to frame a new law, but his resolution was voted down. 
Patterson thought that Banks’ proposition would put us at a disad 
vantage in settling the controversy. Banks insisted that our right 
must be maintained, ^e asked Batterson what the people in the stat 
he represented would say if he asked them whether it was time to de 
fend the rights of this country against Great Britain, -atterson, 
who was of Irish descent and who had a large Irish constituency, 
replied that he was deeply interested in ^rish liberty, but that 
actions in which great interests of the country ’..ere involved re 
4uire great consideration, hanks said that he would rather go to 
the hearts of the people and take counsel of their courage and love
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of country than to go to professional men for advice as to what 
32action to take.
When the bill came to the Senate, Wade asked that it be passed 
by common consent. Sumner moved that it be referred to the Commit­
tee on Foreign Relations. Stunner's motion prevailed and the bill 
was never reported out from the committee. On February 27, 1867
Sumner asked that the committee be discharged from further consid- 
33eration of it." This was agreed to by the Senate. Sumner said
later that if attempts had been made to force passage of the bill,
he was willing to filibuster for five hours at least, and the re-
Z&mainder of the session if necessary.
Seward wrote to Adams: ’There is not one member of this govern­
ment, and, so f r as I know, not one citizen of the United States, 
who expects that this country will waive in any case the demands
that we have heretofore made upon the British government for the re-
25dress of wrongs committed in violation of international law.
Russell's refusal to discuss the question of liability for the 
Alabama claims was regarded as a mistake by many public men in Eng-
cland who sincerely desired to remove all grievance and ill feeling.*' 
It was perceived that the subject was one that involved more substai 
tial questions of law and international conduct which the governmen- 
might consider without abating anything of the dignity and charactei 
of the crown. ^  Olyphant, a member of Parliament, who had traveled 
in the United States and noted a feeling of resentment in this coun 
+-VMT wrntfl nn article in the London Times in which he deplored the
rejection by Lord Russell of all attempts to settle these natural
38difficulties by arbitration."
■
A change in the government brought a brighter outlook to those
6
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who wished to promote friendly feelings between the two countries, 
lord Stanley was considered friendly to the United States, and Sir 
Frederick Bruce was deeply impressed with the necessity of arriving 
at a better understanding than had theretofore existed concerning 
the claims of our citizens for indemnification for injuries sustained 
during the war.
lord Derby in a speech in Parliament intimated that a proposi­
tion for the arrangement of the differences in respect to the claims 
would be favorably entertained by his government. Magazine articles 
began to appear in which it was confessed that the Palmerston govern­
ment had not performed its duty in regard to the Alabama. All 
classes showed a growing disposition to reopen the question and 
settle it as early as possible.4^
In August Seward sent to Adams a list of claims and directed 
him to call the attention of lord Stanley to them in an earnest but 
respectful manner. He said that the president felt that it became 
urgent that friendly relations be established between the two gov­
ernments. He again oharged that the premature and injurious pro­
clamation of belligerency was the unfortunate cause of the present 
unfriendly feeling. He spoke of the "ruinous British warlike exped 
itions against the United States" notwithstanding remonstrance. The 
United States would, however, be willing to consider a comprehensiv 
settlement of any claims whether a boundary, commercial issue, or a 
judicial regulation.41
In answer to Seward's statements, Stanley replied that the 
state of war had been recognized by courts in this country; that
e
it was impossible for the present government of Great Britain to
46
admit liability for the claims put forward; that they could not ac­
knowledge that their predecessors had been wrong; but that they 
would not be disinclined to adopt the principle of arbitration pro­
vided that a fitting arbitrator could be found, and that an agree­
ment could be reached as to the points to which arbitration should 
apply. He insisted, however, that the question of alleged premature 
recognition of belligerency was one as to which ’every state must 
be held to be the sole judge of its duty,"42
To this proposal of lord Stanley, Seward replied that while he 
did not object to the remedy of arbitration, he declined to accept 
it with the limitations which lord Stanley proposed, Seward insis­
ted that the whole controversy should be submitted just as it was 
found in the correspondence between the two governments without im­
posing restrictions, conditions, or limitations on the umpire, and
A r zwithout waiving any principle or argument on either side,
Stanley objected to this unlimited reference since it would 
bring in wider issues which Her Majesty's government could not ar­
bitrate, He suggested two conventions to be set up separately and
simultaneously; one to consider claims arising out of the depreda­
tions of the Alabama and similar vessels, the other to examine the 
general claims of the citizens of both countries. This limited 
reference was tendered upon the condition that the United States 
waive the position that the Queen's proclamation was not justified 
Seward replied: "We can not give any preference to any other 
claims over the Alabama claims. All claims must oe referred to 
one and the same tribunal."45 The United States can not, he said,
44
waive the position they had constantly maintained from the
47
beginning:
"that the Queen's proclamation of 1861 which accorded 
belligerent rights to insurgents against the authority 
of the United States, was not justified on any grounds, 
either of necessity or moral right, and therefore was 
an act of wrongful intervention, a departure from the 
obligation of existing treaties, and without sanction of the law of nations."
A AThe proposed limited reference was therefore declined. The nego­
tiations then ceased for a year. Progress had been made, for Great 
Britain had changed her attitude from an unwillingness to discuss 
the claims to an acceptance of a limited arbitration of them.
Seward wrote to Adams in January, 1868:
"Lord Stanley seems to have resolved that the so-called 
Alabama claims shall be treated so exclusively as a pecun­
iary commercial claim as to insist,on altogether exclud­
ing the proceedings of her Majesty s government in regard 
to the war from consideration in the arbitration which he 
proposed.On the other hand, I have been singularly unfortunate 
in my correspondence if I have not given it to be clearly 
understood that a violation of neutrality..... and kindred
proceedings.... [are^ j regarded as a national wrong and
injury to the United States; and that the lowest form of 
satisfaction for that national injury that the United 
States could accept would be found in an indemnity, with- 
out reservation or compromise, by the British government."
Seward intimated further that other subjects were pending 
which might at any time become a matter of controversy and "that 
Her Majesty's government, if desirous to lay a broad foundation for 
friendly and satisfactory relations, might possibly think it exped­
ient to suggest a conference, in which all matters referred to might 
be considered together and a comprehensive settlement attempted 
without exciting the sensibilities" that were understood to have
caused that government to insist upon a limited arDitration in case 
of the Alabama claims. Adams was instructed to communicate these 
directions informally but with distinct understanding that the
48
United States are not proposing any new negotiations on the question 
Seward suggested to Thornton, the British representative in 
this country, that the naturalization question should be settled by 
a treaty similar to that which the United States signed with the 
North German states; that the San Juan boundary dispute be referred 
to the president of Switzerland ; and that when all these things were 
done, the existing irritation would be so far relieved that "we can 
provide for adjusting the Alabama claims in a manner practically un 
exceptionable to either country."4^
Beverdy Johnson was selected to succeed Adams on June, 1868. 
Johnson did not retain the good opinion at home which his country­
men had when he entered upon his mission. He chapened his office 
by an inordinate love of speech-making, and offended the patriotic
masses at home by his convivial and apparently sympathetic associa-
49tion with the bitterest English partisans of the late rebellion.
50Bright said: "He means well, but has been indiscreet.
Johnson was instructed by Seward to settle difficulties regard­
ing naturalization questions on the basis of the treaty with the 
North German States; to attempt settlement of the Northwest boundar 
dispute; and if Great Britain seemed favorably disposed to settle 
the first two questions, Johnson was to sound out Lord Stanley on 
the subject of settling the claims upon the model of the commission
y
of 1853. 51
Johnson pursued his instructions with vigor, and by October
52protocols were signed to cover the first two questions. He then 
inquired whether he might sign a protocol covering the Alabama 
claims on the basis of the Treaty of 1858, with the King of Prussia
49
as arbitrator.^ Seward directed that Johnson was to insist that 
the treaty be based on that of 1855 without naming any arbitrator
in advance since the Senate would be sure to object to any arbitra-
54tor so named.* ' Seward instructed Johnson to make haste with the
55claims protocol.
The Treaty of 1853 provided that all claims which had been pre­
sented to either government since 1814 should be referred to two 
commissioners, one appointed by the President and the other by the 
Queen. The commissioners were to meet at London. Before making 
any decisions, the commissioners were to name some third party to 
act as arbitrator in any cases where the commissioners could not 
agree. If the commissioners could not agree on who the arbitrator 
was to be, each was to name a person. V/henever the commissioners 
could not agree on a decision, one of the persons named as arbitra­
tor was to be chosen by lot for that particular case. The commis- 
sioners were to consider all evidence which might be submitted by 
their governments^-1^  to hear one person for each government who
would represent it as counsel. The*re was to be no appeal from the
56decision of the arbitrator. u
On November 10, 1868, Johnson and Stanley had completed a con­
vention for the settlement of all outstanding claims which had 
arisen since 1853. This convention provided for the submission of 
all claims of British subjects against the United States, and of 
all- claims of citizens of the United States against Ureat Britain, 
to a tribunal of four commissioners, two to be appointed by each 
government. The tribunal was to sit in London. The convention 
also provided that the settlement of all claims except the Alabama
50
claims should he determined by a majority vote. In the case of the 
Alabama claims a unanimous decision would be required. If the com­
mission should be unable to come to a unanimous vote, the claims 
should be referred to the sovereign head of a friendly state who 
should be chosen before any of the claims were considered by the 
commissioners. In respect to all other claims, if the commissioner 
were unable to come to a decision, an arbitrator was to be chosen 
by lot from two named by the commissioners, one being chosen by the 
representatives of each country. The convention further provided 
that neither government should make out a case to support its posi­
tion touching the Alabama claims. Only the official correspondence
already exchanged on the subject was to be laid before the commis-
57sioners or the arbitrator.
Seward was disappointed with the convention. It made him 
"sick, quite sick," he said. "The whole thing was wrong, contrary 
to instructions, must be sent b a c k . I n  the cabinet meeting 
Seward did not make clear what his objections to the convention 
were. President Johnson was anxious about the trea.ty. He said he 
desired to accept and send in the treaty. He did not know why this 
one was not in good shape. Welles said he thought that Seward had 
not been disposed to hasten a decision, and that he wished to pro­
long the negotiations. Seward had requested that the English sub­
mit to arbitration the question whether the British government had
59acted with due diligence.
Two days later Seward read to the cabinet his instructions 
which he proposed to send to Johnson. They contained his objection
qoid must sit in Washington to the convention. The commission, »
s
»
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not London, due to the highly disturbed national sensibilities. He 
objected that the Alabama claims were discriminated against, in 
that: first, they required the decision of the commissioners upon 
any of those claims to be unanimous; second, in that they prescribed 
a different mode for the choice of an umpire for the Alabama claims 
from that provided in respect of all other claims; and third, that 
in the case of the Alabama claims the choice of an arbitrator was 
limited to the sovereign head of a friendly state while in the case 
of other claims no such restriction was made, objected also to 
the provision which prohibited additional argument and evidence. He 
thought that this limitation might excite distrust among the people 
of both countries.
These instructions were not approved by the President nor any 
member of the cabinet. Welles and Evarts inquired whether claims 
for captures, destruction of property, and prizes were to be per­
mitted. Seward avoided an explicit answer. Evarts thought that if 
such claims were permitted, the British claims against the United 
States would be larger than the claims of the United States against 
Great Britain. The President favored postponing a final decision 
in regard to the despatch, but Seward wanted an immediate decision. 
After the cabinet meeting the President had a consultation with 
Welles. The President wished to have the subject disposed of dur­
ing his Administration or to have the Senate responsible for the 
delay. Welles advised the President that since the subject was in 
the hands of Seward, he would be dissatisfied if overruled by 
others and his views set aside. Welles thought it would be well
under the circumstances to let Seward try further negotiatio
with Reverdy Johnson. Johnson followed this advice and directed 
Seward to send the despatch.
Johnson was surprised to learn that the treaty was not satis­
factory. Before the changes recommended by Seward could be made 
another change was made in the British government. Stanley was re­
placed in the Foreign Office by Clarendon.Negotiations were im­
mediately continued, and in a week's time Seward was able to tell 
the cabinet that the claims of Englishmen for property destroyed in 
the war and prizes condemned in our courts would not be included. 
She cabinet was much relieved.64
Amendments were promptly made to the Stanley-Johnson conven­
tion which, it was thought, would make the scheme acceptable in 
this country. On January 14, 1869 the new convention was signed. 
It provided for the settlement of all claims arising since the 
Treaty of 1853. There was to be a board of four instead of two 
commissioners as provided by the earlier convention. The Alabama 
claims were not expressly referred to, and the modes prescribed for 
the choice of an arbitrator was uniform to all claims. Arbitrators 
were to be chosen by lot in each particular case where the commis­
sioners were unable to agree. The Johnson-Clarendon convention con 
tained the further provision that if the commissioners, or any two 
of them, should think it desirable that a sovereign of a friendly 
state should be arbitrator in any claim, the commissioners should 
report the fact to their respective governments, who within six 
months would agree upon some such person to be invited to decide 
upon the claim. Before this arbitrator should be laid the official
correspondence which had taken place between the two governments,
53
and any other written documents which were presented to the com­
missioners in respect to the claim.65
Seward was delighted with the treaty. he was especially 
eager to bring to a satisfactory solution the complications which 
arose while he occupied the State Department; but he soon realized 
the difficulties in the way of ratification. The administration 
of President Johnson was unpopular and he was to be in a few months 
replaced by Grant. Seward wrote to Johnson, "Political adversaries 
finding your negotiations crowned with complete success, will cavil 
at the several treaties which you will have made, on the ground 
that they fall short of what might and ought to have been secured." 
"The confused light of an incoming administration was spreading 
itself over the country, rendering the consideration of political
c rtsubjects irksome, if not inconvenient." It was felt by some tha1
68the subject properly belonged to the new Administration. Little
favor was shown towards the treaty in the cabinet. Welles and
McCulloch were outspoken in their opposition, but the President
69threw his support to Seward and submitted it to the Senate.
The convention was discussed in executive session and was re­
jected by the vote of 54 to 1. The sensational feature of the de­
bate was Sumner* s speech. Although delivered in executive session, 
it was released for publication by authority of the Senate. This 
speech is of importance because of the relation it bears to subse­
quent negotiations.^ It put obstacles well nigh insuperable in 
the way of any future approach to an adjustment.
In Sumner's case against England, he held that country liable
on three grounds: first, in the concession of ocean belligerency;
secondly, in the negligence which allowed the evasion of the ships 
in order to enter upon hostile expeditions against the United States; 
and thirdly, in the open complicity with which she gave welcome to 
Confederate cruisers in British ports, he revived the national 
claims which Seward had dropped, ■“■e estimated the direct damages or 
individual losses at $>15,000,000. "But this," he said, "leaves 
without recognition the vaster damage to commerce driven from the 
ocean, and that other damage, immense and infinite, caused by the 
prolongation of the war, all of which may be called national in 
contradistinction to individual." The indirect damage to American 
commerce was put by him at $>110,000,000, which he said was "only an 
item in our bill." he declared that the rebellion had been "Sup­
pressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars," that 
through British intervention the war was doubled in duration, and 
that England was "justly responsible for the additional expendi­
ture." He added, "To my mind our first duty is to make England see 
what she has done to us. How the case shall be settled, whether by 
money more or less, by territorial compensation, by apology, or by 
an amendment of the law of nations, is still an open question; all
may be combined."7^
By the almost unanimous vote against the convention, taken 
immediately after Sumner's speech, the Senate indorsed his views 
and by releasing the speech for publication proclaimed them to the 
world. Adams said of that speech that its practical effect was to 
raise the scale of demands of reparation so high that there was 
little chance of negotiation left, unless the English had lost all 
their spirit and character.72 John Bright said: "The rejection of -
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the claims convention hy the Senate is a great misfortune, and
Charles Sumner's speech, so hostile and vindictive, has caused much
pain and disappointment."'^ The London press made the speech the
topic of hostile criticism, and public men in England were unanimous
74-in opposition to Sumner's views.
In this country the speech met with hearty approval of the
Senate. Anthony, who was in the chair, said, "That was a great
7 5speech." Other senators congratulated Sumner. Grant's views 
conformed with those of Sumner, and after the speech Grant thankedI7 6and congratulated Sumner. Welles spoke of the'faanly vigor and
77true statesmanship" which the speech displayed. The Republican 
press applauded the speech loudly.^ Indeed, it would have been 
too much to expect that a treaty submitted by the Johnson adminis­
tration would be acted upon favorably by a Congress which had been 
selected in November with great majorities for Grant. The fault of
the treaty was that it offered absolutely nothing and might have
79left matters in worse condition than they previously were. Sumner 
wrote to lieber: "I have made no demand, not a word of apology, not
a dollarl nor have I menaced, suggested, or thought of war....My
object was simply to expose our wrongs as plainly but as gently as 
possible.... To my mind our first duty is to make England to see 
what she has done to us."88
Lord John Russell did not regret the action of the Senate in 
rejecting the Johnson-Clarendon convention. He wrote: "The fault
of the convention___was....  that it would have been open to the
United States to contend that the conduct of the British governmen 
had been throughout wanting in good faith, and that an arbiter
56
chosen by lot, perhaps Mr. Sumner, or a foreign power or State 
should decide upon points deeply affecting the honor of the British 
government.1
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Chapter III.
The Fish-Rose Convention
After the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon convention by 
the almost unanimous vote of the Senate, the Federal Government 
took up the work anew under President Grant. President Grant 
was a military man, and, according to Sumner, he was known to 
feel intensely on the Alabama question. At the close of the war 
he had expressed himself in a way hostile to Great Britain.
Sumner said of him: "He (Grant) cared little whether England 
paid our little bill or not; upon the whole, he would rather she 
would not, as that would leave the precedent of her conduct in 
full force for us to follow, and he wished it understood that we 
should follow it.”"*’ It was known that Grant had heartily approved 
of Sumner's speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, and his views 
carried great influence throughout the country.
Fish, the Secretary of State, being new in his position, 
was inclined at first to defer as far as possible to Sumner. Ee, 
of course, looked to Grant as the head of the administration and 
always gave him his steady loyalty. Inexperienced in foreign 
affairs as he was at first and inclined to be distrustful of him­
self on questions of international law, the Secretary seemed to
Ohave turned to Caleb Cushing most frequently for advice.
Sumner, by virtue of his long experience as chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, believed himself, of all the persons 
connected with the administration the best informed on questions 
of foreign relations. His views, it was well known, were far
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his influence in the Senate and in the country was great. What 
he thought was certain to have an important hearing on the out­
come of any negotiations.
Early in the administration discontent and dissatisfaction 
were manifesting themselves among the leaders of the party. Welles 
observed that Sumner was wrathful and indignant at Grant's course 
in making appointments. Sumner complained among his friends that 
he was offered nothing nor even consulted in regard to the Cabi­
net, appointments abroad, or as to the policy which the adminis-
•55tration should pursue. ' Indeed Sumner had not approved of Grant's 
nomination as president, though he campaigned for him. Sumner 
early incurred Grant's disfavor when the latter wished to appoint 
Washburne as Secretary of State as a compliment, and again later 
when Grant wished to have the appointment of A. T. Stewart for 
Secretary of Treasury confirmed. Stewart was engaged in business
and his appointment would have been a violation of an early law 
which orovided that "no person apoointed to any office instituted 
by the act shall directly or indirectly be concerned in carrying 
on the business of trade or commerce." Grant wished congress to 
exempt Stewart from this provision. Sumner led the opposition 
in the Senate to setting the law aside. By increasing this ani­
mosity Fish was later able to Influence Grant to support negotia­
tions of a conciliatory nature with Great Britain.
Motley, a close friend of Sumner, was nominated as minister 
to England. Sumner had recommended Motley's appointment at least 
twice. Sumner's biographer maintains that the appoint-
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ment was not made because of Sumner's influence.^ Partisans of 
i?ish and Grant said that the appointment was made only on Sumner's 
insistence, since Motley was scheduled to return to Vienna, where 
he had served during the previous administration.0 The truth 
doubtless lies between these two statements, and the appointment 
was probably made as a concession to Sumner in order to maintain 
harmony with the party.
The preparation of the instructions for Motley again brought 
out the difficulty of reconciling Sumner's views with the general 
policies of the administration. When it became necessary to make 
a statement in regard to the proclamation of belligerency, some­
thing must be said which would not clash with the president's 
desire to recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerents. On 
the other hand the statement must contain nothing which might 
impair Sumner's position that the recognition of the Southern 
States as belligerents during the Civil War had converted a mere 
rebellion into a prolonged war.
The Cuban insurrection had inspired considerable sympathy 
in our contry especially in Hew York. Appeals were made to the 
government of the United States to aid the Cubans. Those who 
sympathized with the Cubans had enlisted the support of Bawlins, 
the Secretary of War, who had great influence over Grant. Rawlins 
had early converted Grant to his views and the President desired 
to aid the Cubans. Such action would have been in direct conflict 
with the attitude which the United States government had taken 
with reference to the British proclamation of an earlier periou.
Sumner was consulted in preparing the instructions, ae sug-
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the controversy with England. Motley’s statement was rejected by 
Fish without any protest from Sumner.''' Sumner also prepared a 
memorandum which he proposed as the basis for Motley's instruction^. 
In it he said that it was not advisable at present to attempt any 
renewed negotiations. He then stressed the wrong which the people 
of Great Britain had committed by the proclamation of 1861. The 
sense of wrong he said had now been declared gravely, solemnly, 
and without passion. He said also that the sense of wrong was not 
to be expunged by a mere money payment to reimburse our losses at 
sea. This statement hinted strongly at the annexation of Canada 
as a method of reparation. He said that the time would come when 
Great Britain would see her fault, and be disposed to confess it, 
and reparations of some sort would naturally follow. Obviously 
Sumner’s idea was to delay a settlement as long as possible. Fish 
now prepared his first draft of the instructions, in which he avoid­
ed mentioning the proclamation of belligerency as a point in our 
case against England. Sumner stood strongly in his position against 
the waiver of this point. As soon as he learned of the substance 
of this first draft he became highly excited and rushed to Ban­
croft, Davis and exclaimed: "Is it the purpose of the adminis­
tration to sacrifice me —  me, a senator from Massachussets?"
Two days later he went to Fish, still highly excited and threaten­
ed he would make Motley resign. To this Fish replied, " Let him
Qresign. I will put a better man in his place." This put Sumner 
in a more reasonable frame of mind, and he prepared another state­
ment of the case in which he was less positive and exacting in
his views, but this statement he withdrew as being inadequate.
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I Me wrote to Motley: "YourTns^ruuETons can not reacn you until !
Tuesday. I have called in G. C. (Caleb Gushing), who has just 
come from the secretary. The first draft was fatal -- very. I
i«9Vprotested, and wrote a substitute, last evening I dined at Fish's.
The next morning he again wrote to Motley: "I wrote a note
to Fish withdrawing my draft, and at the same time expressing my
dissent from the draft he proposed. My purpose was to leave him
make his own statement, for which I should in no way be respon- 
10sible." This note pointed to the coming conflict which would
ensue if the negotiations were not carried out according to the 
views of the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee.
What occured when Fish dined with Sumner is not in evidence,
but evidently the two disagreed. When Fish received the note
which was referred to above, he wrote to the Senator:
"General Cushing called on me..... as I understood on your
suggestion.... I had determined to ask to introduce your 
suggestions.... I am sorry to receive your note this morn­
ing. I think that you are scarcely doing justice to me or to 
the Administration. We have but one object, and differ only 
as to some incidents, —  they may be of more importance than 
I suppose, or of less than you think, but can hardly be of 
sufficient importance to break up an effort at negotiation 
or to break down the Administration. I trust, therefore, 
that you will reconsider the intimations of your letter."ll
That Sumner did reconsider is shown by the fact that when 
Cushing drew up a compromise statement during a conference with 
Fish, Sumner expressed his approval of them. He then said that
he did not believe that our foreign policy would justify a more 
vigorous statement at that time.
In preparing the instructions to Motley, Fish had three 
objects in view. First, he wished to show that the rejection of the
claims convention by the Senate was not an act of unfriendliness
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Secondly, he wished to suggest a suspension of negotiations until 
the prevailing irritation should subside. Thirdly, he wished to 
make clear that the government of the United States did not base 
its claims on the British recognition of belligerent rights to 
the Southern States. Of these points the last was the most im­
portant as well as the most troublesome. This point vitally 
affected the course of future negotiations, and also because it in­
volved a sovereign right which it was the interest of all nations 
to preserve. Furthermore, the United States now wished to be in 
a position to exercise that right in the insurrection prevailing 
in Cuba. It was this third point which would bring the administra­
tion into conflict with those who, like Sumner, considered the 
concession of belligerency a ground for claims against a govern­
ment.
The views of Fish on the question of belligerency were ex­
pressed in the instructions as follows:
"The President recognizes the right of every power, when a 
civil conflict has arisen within another state, and has 
attained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and complete­
ness, to define its own relations and those of its citizens
and subjects toward the parties to the conflict.....
"The necessity and propriety of the original concession 
of belligerency by Great Britain at the time it was made hav| 
been contested and are not admitted... The President re­
gards that concession as a part of the case only so far as 
it shows the beginning and the animus of that course of con­
duct which resulted so disastrously to the United States. It 
is important in that it foreshadows subsequent events.
"There were other powers that were contemporaneous with 
England in similar concession, but it was in England only 
that the concession was supplemented by acts causing direct 
damage to the United States. The President is careful to 
make this discrimination, because he is anxious as much as 
possible to simplify the case, and to bring into view these 
subsequent acts, which are so important in determining the 
question between the two countries."
In regard to the future course of the negotiations, Fish said:
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"This government, in rejecting the recent convention, aban­
dons neither its own claims nor those of its cltizens, nor the hope of an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement 
of the questions... The time and circumstances under which 
the convention was negotiated were very unfavorable to its 
acceptance either by the people or the Senate. The nation 
had Just emerged from its periodical choice of a Chief Magis­
trate, and having changed the depository of its confidence.... looked with no favor on an attempt at settlement of the
great and grave questions depending by those on the eve of
retiring from power without consulting.... the views of the
ruler recently intrusted with their confidence....(The Sen­
ate's) refusal can be no subject of complaint, and can give 
no occasion for dissatisfaction or criticism......  A sus­
pension of the discussion on these questions for a short 
time... will allow the subsidence of any excitement or irri­
tation growing out of the negotiation or of the rejection of 
the treaty —  will enable the two governments to approach
the more readily to a solution of their differences......
(The President) hopes that when the question shall again 
be considered it may comport with the views of Her Majesty's 
Government to embrace within the scope of the negotiations 
some agreement by the two governments, defining their re­
spective rights and duties as neutrals."14
In communicating these instructions to Lord Clarendon,
Motley very decidedly departed from their spirit. His tone 
showed that he was inclined to follow Sumner's reasoning on the 
question. He said that he was fully sensible of the gravity of 
the questions involved and of the contingencies that would de­
pend upon the negotiations concerning such burning questions as 
those comprehended under the simple title of a convention for 
the settlement of all outstanding claims. These questions he 
said hinged on great principles of law and involved the welfare 
of nations and the contingencies of war and peace. Of the re­
jected convention he said: "(It would have) covered up a griev­
ance which most certainly would have continued to rankle and to 
fester beneath the surface and (those wounds) must be probed 
before they could be healed." In regard to the recognition of 
belligerency, Motley said that the President recognized the right 
of a sovereign power to issue proclamations of neutrality under
4
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proper conditions, but that such measures must always be taken 
with a full view of the grave responsibilities assumed. In con­
clusion Motley said that he meant to do his best to bring about 
better relations, but he thought the path was surrounded by perils. 
He said that enlightened statesmen like those of England would 
not forget that grave and disastrous misunderstandings and cruel 
wars resulted as often in history from passionately excited emotion 
and Injured feelings as from cabinet deliberations and political 
combinations. He said he sometimes confessed to a despondent
feeling as to the possibility of the two nations ever understand- 
15ing each other.
Grant was angry when this report was received in Washington. 
Such an Interpretation as Motley gave to the Queen's proclamation 
would have supplied Spain good grounds for action in the event 
that the President issued the Cuban proclamation. Grant did not 
want any such statement endorsed by his administration, and he 
requested Fish to recall Motley. Fish, wishing to avoid an open 
breach with Sumner, persuaded Grant to allow Motley to continue 
at his post, but with the understanding that any further negotia­
tions in regard to the Alabama claims would be conducted in Wash- 
16ington.
During June 1869, the newspapers were circulating rumors
that there were differences between Sumner and Fish. Sumner
feared the effect of such reports on our case with England. He
17wrote to Cushing, "There should be union at home. Fish and 
Sumner agreed that something must be done to stop the rumor.
With the consent of Sumner, Fish sent a dispatch to the press in 
which he said that Sumner had been consulted while the instructions
s
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were being prepared, and that Sumner had approved of the course
which Motley was directed to pursue. Fish said further that
Sumner thought that the instructions were as firm and as vigorous
as our foreign policy would justify at the time. He concluded
by saying: "At no time has Mr. Sumner been in closer accord or in
more direct sympathy with the policy of President Grant than at 
„18present." Cushing reported that that statement had its desired 
effect, and that the comments in the press had ceased.
Throughout the summer of 1869 Sumner corresponded frequently 
with Motley. A letter of June 15 stated his position on the con­
troversy with England. He said:
"England must listen, and at last yield. I do not despair 
seeing the debate end— (1) In the withdrawal of England 
from this hemisphere; (2) In remodelling maritime inter­
national law. Such a consummation would place our republic 
at the head of the civilized world.
During the same summer and for a year thereafter, Fish at­
tempted to start negotiations on the basis of Sumner's view in 
regard to Canada. The same views were endorsed by Grant. On 
June 11 Thornton attempted to obtain a definite statement of the 
basis upon which the American government was prepared to resume 
efforts towards a settlement. The exchange of views took a form 
which remained virtually unchanged for many months. Sumner re­
ported what Fish had told him. He said to Motley:
"Fish said to him (Thornton) that our claims were too large 
to be settled pecuniarily, and sounded him about Canada, 
to which he (Thornton) replied that England did not wish 
to keep Canada, but could not part with it without the con­
sent of the population.1,20
In later conversations with Thornton, Fish continued to men­
tion the question of Canada. Thornton always replied in a similar 
vein: "The Canadians find fault with me for saying so openly as
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I do that we are ready to let them go whenever they shall wish; 
but they do not desire it." Fish had even suggested to Thorn­
ton that he ascertain whether Her Majesty's Government would
offer any objection to a free vote being taken in Canada to de­
cide whether the people desire to join with the United States or 
not.22
In a cabinet meeting in November 1869, Grant suggested the 
possibility of Great Britain quitting Canada and intimated that 
in that event we should be satisfied with the payment for losses 
actually sustained, combined with a settlement of satisfactory 
principles of maritime law. He was unwilling to adjust the claims 
until Great Britain was ready to give up Canada. Certain cabinet 
members assured Grant that Great Britain looked up on Canada as 
a weakness. Grant replied, "if that be so, I would be willing 
to settle at once."2 -^
Early in the summer, Sir John Rose, a member of the commission 
which had been appointed to settle the claims of the Hudson's 
Bay and Puget Sound companies against the United States arrived in 
Washington. He was in the confidence of Lord Clarendon and the 
real object of his visit was to sound the government on the sub­
ject of the Alabama claims. Fish had already intimated that the 
views as expressed by Sumner on the annexation of Canada were not
in accord with his own views as to the best means of arriving at 
24an agreement.
On the 26th of June, Cushing wrote to Rose saying that he
had seen Fish and had arranged for a meeting of the two. Cushing'
wrote to Rose: "I am not sanguine of immediate conclusion of....
a treaty as either you or I might desire, but I think the time
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has arrived to commence, trusting that discretion, patience, and
good-will on both sides may eventuate, in this important matter,
satisfactorily to the two governments."2®
On the 8th of July Rose met Pish and on the next day at din-
ner, the first interview took place. Already Pish expressed a
willingness to depart from Sumner's demands. Bancroft Davis, the
assistant secretary of state, made this record of the interview:
"Mr. Fish said that the time had not arrived; that the 
British people were too much irritated by the rejection 
of the treaty, and by Mr. Sumner's speech, and that our 
people were too much carried away with the idea of paying 
off the cost of the war with the amount of damages that 
Mr. Sumner’s speech had made out against Great Britain.
He said that when the excitement subsided, the appointment 
as special envoy of man of high rank, authorized to express 
some kind word of regret, would pave the way for a settle­
ment; and he outlined to Sir Sohn the exact scheme for , 
settlement which was adopted a year and a half later."2®
Sumner's views at this same time were not so conciliatory.
On July 19 he wrote to Cushing:•
"There is a lull in our relations with England, which....will continue until broken by Congress....It seems best
that our case....with all details, should be stated to 
England without any demand of any kind. England must know 
our grievances before any demand can be presented. When this is comprehended, a settlement will be easy."2?
Sumner visited Fish in August, 1869 and advised him to renew 
the discussion with the British government by a fresh and vigor­
ous statement of our case. Sumner thought that unless something 
were done before Congress assembled, there would be dissatisfac- 
tion in that body, and there might something occur which would be 
unfavorable to a peaceful settlement. Butler had hinted to him
that such an occurrence would be quite likely.2® In a letter to
.
Motley Sumner said:
"I.....advised (Pish) strongly to present our case before
the meeting of Congress....  Or there would be dissatisfac­
tion. I think I made an impression on him, for he invited
7Z
me to prepare such a paper. This I declined...... I am
pained at the attacks I fear (Fish) must encounter. A vig­
orous presentment of our case will take from critics one of 
their weapons.”29
In a private letter Fish again expressed his views on the
question of a settlement with Ungland. These views again show the
wide divergence from those of Sumner. Fish wrote:
"I should esteem it the greatest glory, and greatest happi­
ness of my life, if it could be settled while I remain in 
official position; and I should esteem it the greatest 
benefit to my country to bring it to an early settlement.... 
I want to have the question settled, I would not if I could 
impose any humiliating condition on Great Britain, I would 
not be a party to anything that proposes to 'threaten her',
I believe that she is great enough to be just; and I trust 
that she is wise enough to maintain her own greatness. • ho 
greatness is inconsistent with some errors.... ^r. Bright 
thinks she was drawn into errors— so do we. If she can be 
brought to think so, it will not be necessary for her to say 
so--at least not very loudly. It may be said by a defini­
tion of what shall be Maritime International Lav/ in the 
future, and a few kind words. She will want in the future 
what wa have claimed. Thus she will be benefited— we satis­
fied.”30
Sumner, in an address delivered before the Republican State 
Convention, on September 22, 1869, restated his views on the re­
cognition of belligerency, and went on to urge the cession of 
Canada as compensation for our claims. He said that the union of 
Canada with the United States was an appointed destiny, but that 
it must come about be peaceful means and with the consent of the 
Canadian people.^1 In view of a later statement made by him, 
this last point is very significant.
By the autumn of 1869 the waning fortunes of the Cuban in-' 
surgents and the death of Rawlins, the chief supporter of the 
Cubans, had pushed that issue into the background of the adminis­
tration’s foreign policy. It was now possible for the Secretary 
of State to state Sumner's view on the question of belligerency
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which was also Grant's position. Fish took Sumner’s advice of the 
month before, and with the help of Gushing, he wrote in the in­
structions of September 25, a vigorous statement of our case with­
out any demand, These instructions adopted more of the views of 
Sumner as the policy of the administration, even including the 
’indirect damages.” Lord Clarendon remarked that it was Sumner's 
speech all over again.3 • In these instructions Fish said:
’The ^resident. is not yet prepared to pronounce on the 
question of the indemnities which he thinks due from Great 
Britain to the individual citizen of the United States for 
the destruction of their property by rebel cruisers fitted 
out in the ports of Great Britain. Bor is he now prepared 
to speak of the reparation which he thinks due by the 
British government for the larger accounts of national in­
juries it has inflicted on, the United States. Bor does he 
attempt now to measure the relative effects of the various 
causes of injury; as, whether by the untimely recognition 
of belligerency; by suffering the fitting out of rebel 
cruisers; or by the supply of ships, arms, and munitions of
war to the Confederates......All these subjects are for
future consideration. .........
"At the present stage of the controversy the sole ob­
ject of the president is to state the position of the United 
States in the various relations and aspects of this grave 
controversy with Great 3ritain. It is the object of this
paper...... to state calmly and dispassionately....what
this government seriously considers the injuries it has 
suffered. It is not written as in the nature of a claim, 
for the United States now make no demand against Her 
Majesty's Government pn .account of the injuries they feel 
they have sustained."00
Motley was instructed to read these instructions to Lord Clarendon
but not to leave a written copy unless it was particularly re
quested by him.
In the autumn of 1869 Rose was again heard from. He said 
that he had had conversations in more than one quarter in which 
he conveyed his belief that a kindly word, or an expression of 
regret, such as would not involve the acknowledgement of wrong, 
was likely to be more potential than the most irrefragable
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reasoning on principles of international law. Hose thought that 
Motley had tried not to be too friendly so as to avoid the error 
which Johnson had made. He thought that Motley was unsatisfac­
tory as a representative. He wrote to Fish; "If I am right in 
my impression that you would prefer Washington and a new man, 
and you think it worth while (for) me to repeat that suggestion
as one from myself in the proper quarter, a line from you......
34will enable me to do so.”
After the British had received Fish's instructions of Septem­
ber 25, Thornton was instructed to get an intimation of what 
would be accepted by the United States government as a settlement 
for the claims. Both Fish and Thornton agreed that it would be 
unwise to attempt any negotiations unless there was reasonable 
assurance that an agreement was reached. Fish was at the time 
not prepared to give a definite statement since, as he wrote to 
Sumner, he was not willing to do any thing until he had a chance 
to learn what the Senate and the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
would agree to. Fish was anxious to know just what the Senate 
and Sumner would accept, and he wrote to the Senator on November 
16; "Will you either note what you think will be sufficient to 
meet the views of the Senate and of the country, or will you for­
mulate such proposition? Let me hear from you as soon as you can, 
and I should like to confer with you at the earliest convenient 
time."®6
During the summer of 1869 another situation was developing 
which was to have important influence on the negotiations with 
England. Grant became interested in San Domingo and made the
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annexation of that island a policy of his administration. Civil 
war was being waged on the island, and the leaders of one of the 
factions had enlisted Grant's support. Grant sent Babcock, his 
private secretary, to the island to inquire into the resources, 
and the social and political conditions. Two warships were also 
sent to the island. Backed by this show of force, Babcock signed 
with authorized agents a protocol stipulating that for ^1.500,000 
to pay the debt of the island, the agents would turn the country 
over to the United States. It was also stipulated in the proto­
col that Grant would use his private influence in the United 
States to secure the acceptance of the scheme in that country.
When the protocol was brought up in the cabinet, no member offered 
to approve of it. Fish wished to resign, but upon Grant's in­
sistence he reconsidered, and reluctantly gave his support to the 
enterprise with the understanding that Grant would give Fish a free 
hand in other matters relating to the State Department, Babcock 
was sent to the island again and negotiated two more treaties, 
one for annexation and the other for the lease of the Bay of 
Samana. In order to get the treaties before the Senate, Grant 
called at Sumner's home to discuss them. When the President left,O
Sumner told him*. "Mr. President, I am an administration man and 
what ever you do will always find in me the most careful and 
candid consideration."^ Grant understood this statement as a
pledge of support while Sumner meant just what he said--that he
37would give the treaties most careful and candid consideration*^
Fish did not intend to yield to Great Britain at all points. 
Through his agreement with Grant in the San Domingo affair, dish
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was able to induce the President to make a statement in his 
annual message in December 1869 which would allow the secretary to | 
maintain the case against Great Britain on the basis of his first 
instructions to motley. The ^resident said that while the Govern­
ment maintained it should be its own Judge when to accord the rights 
of belligerency to the Guban insurgents, it did not believe that 
they had yet developed a de_ facto political organization sufficient 
to Justify a recognition of belligerency. In this message Grant 
also spoke of the indirect injuries which resulted from the course 
pursued by Great Britain during the war. Speaking of these in­
juries in reference to the Johnson-Clarendon Convention he said:
"The convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims, 
from which they differ more widely in their character than 
in the magnitude of their amount, great even as it that 
difference, hot a word was found in the treaty, and not an 
inference could be drawn from it, to remove the &ense of 
the unfriendliness of the course of Great Britain..."*38
He said he believed that the rejection of the convention by 
the Senate was a step in the direction of a perfect and cordial 
friendship between the two countries.
In January the San Domingo treaties were submitted to the 
committee. On March 15 the committee reported adversely, only 
Morton and Marian being in favor of annexation. Grant suspected 
the adverse report was due to Sumner's influence. He felt that 
the Senator had been faithless, for Grant had understood him to 
promise support to the treaty. Sumner insisted that he had merely 
promised to give the treaty his careful and candid consideration, 
which he did. Harlan, who favored annexation, later made a 
statement in. the Senate, and which went uncontested^ that Sumner
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—had withheld his opinions of the treaty when it was discussed in
the committee so that he might not unduly influence the judgment of 
39his associates. Sumner felt all along that the treaty would
40never receive the consent of the committee. Such was the state­
ment which he made to the press in 1871. Grant's feelings were 
described by Forney in a letter to Sumner February 22 while the 
treaty was still before the committee: "She President had evi­
dently determined to stand by the Republican Party and to strike
down the Republican statesmen. The idea has got abroad here that
4GLhe has marked you out for sacrifice...”
When the treaty was discussed in executive session, Sumner
spoke against it. Morton wrote in a private letter;
"In the progress of the discussion on the treaty Sumner 
became much excited and talked freely against the manner 
of its negotiation and bitterly assailed Babcock in a way 
which could only reflect on the President. Charges of 
fraud and corruption were sent from here (Washington) over 
the country which the President believed emanated indirectly 
from Sumner."
Finally Fish became assured that the treaty could not pass
the Senate. A private count of the likely vote showed that the
requisite two-thirds could not be obtained in favor of it. Fish
urged Sumner, who, as chairman of the committee, could control
the situation, to bring the matter to a vote and have it disposed
43of. This Sumner refused to do.
Fish hinted at Sumner's appointment as minister to England 
in Motley's place if he would change his attitude. Grant, it was 
known had such a scheme in mind to get rid of Sumner in the Sen­
ate, but he declared he would make the appointment only with the 
understanding that the Senator should be removed from his new
•U 7$
=  "" , .m..r . . .  I.. „ „ — ■' - -    — !..■ * 1 ■ -■ -'  ^V1'. ■•■Q-.T r ■ .■
office as soon as his name should be confirmed. “ Such schemes 
were not successful. The vote was taken in the Senate on June 30, 
and the treaty was rejected by a vote of 28 to 28, two-thirds 
being necessary to ratify.
The breach between Grant and Sumner was now definitely mark­
ed. Motley, who was considered unsatisfactory as a minister in 
London, was asked to resign the day following the rejection of the 
treaty. All but the routine duties had been taken from him as a 
result of his departure from instructions in the summer of 1869. 
how that the administration rupture had occurred, there was no 
longer any need to allow Motley to remain at his post. However, 
Motley refused to resign, and was recalled later in the year.
The material results of this incident as it is related to 
the controversy with Great Britain are that it gave Fish an oppor­
tunity to carry his Cuban policy through and keep his position on 
the belligerency proclamation uncompromised. Furthermore, it 
assured him of the President's support in putting through a set­
tlement with Great Britain over any difficulties which Sumner 
might raise. President Grant, he was sure, would favor anything 
which Sumner might now oppose.
Fish was steadily increasing in his influence over the Presi­
dent. During the summer of 1870 the Cuban affair again came up 
to perplex the administration. Lobbyists Were active in 'Washing­
ton and promises of Cuban recognition were secured. Cuban bonds, 
the value of which was contingent upon the action of this govern­
ment, were distributed. Pressure was brought to bear on tiie 
House Committee on Foreign Relations whose chairman was Banks. It
7lf
was well Known that tms committeesffE'l!f??id to t6.Se
to the Cuban Independence. Fish had made every effort during the
preceding months to set the administration right on this question.
He had prepared a message for Grant, but the latter had refused to 
let it go out. When action by the House seemed imminent, he pre­
pared another report on the subject which was the basis of the pres:, 
dent's message to Congress. With the aid of Hoar, Cox, and Robeson, 
President Grant was induced to approve it but with great hesita­
tion and with much r e l u c t a n c e T h e  message was issued just the 
day before the committee was to report. In this message the Presi­
dent was made to repeat what he said about Cuban belligerency in 
December 1869- He then exposed the plot of the Cubans, pointing 
out that they were speculating on their ability to involve the
United States in the contest. He made clear what dangers were in-
46volved in supporting such a revolution.
Banks introduced the majority resolution which favored re­
cognizing the insurgents. Orth of Indiana introduced a minority 
report opposing such action. In the debate which followed the 
President and the Secretary of State were severely criticized for 
influencing legislation. Fish particularly was made the object of 
abuse, but he won a complete victory for his policy. The minority 
resolutions were adopted by the House in an amended form so that 
they were a mere authorization to protest against the barbarous 
conduct of hostilities. In the Senate, Sumner opposed the admin­
istration and spoke of the "unnatural jurisdiction in the New 
World" and spoke of similar aspirations for independence in the 
colonies of Great Britain. The resolutions were not brought to
so
a vote in tin Senate.47 Sumner's influence was thus much lessened 
and Fish was vindicated in his stand in the Cuban question.
Foreign affairs in Europe during 1870 were far from reassur­
ing for Gre- t Britain. The international situation was becoming 
complicated and the future was uncertain. The influence of the 
Franco-Prussian War upon the progress for settlement was indicated 
by a response of Thornton when Fish had once more mentioned Can­
adian independence as a condition. Thornton said; "Europe may at 
any moment be convulsed; and if England became involved, it would 
be impossible to prevent retaliation, and the ocean would swarm
48with Alabamas. England would then be compelled to declare war." 
Fish replied that commerce destroyers would be fitted out in 
American ports by England's enemies in spite of anything the Gov­
ernment could do to prevent it. Notwithstanding this gloomy out­
look, the British government showed no signs of relinquishing 
Canada.
During the summer of 1870 the idea of Canadian annexation was 
losing popularity in the United States due to the decline of Sum­
ner's influence, since he had been the principal champion of the 
policy. He had discredited himself with the administration by 
blocking all expansionist plans while pushing his own favorite 
project. Grant, in spite of his hostility to Sumner, still clung 
to the policy of exacting Canada as a condition for settlement.
In September he prevailed upon Fish to mention the policy once 
more to Thornton. By this time the Franco-Prussian War had passed 
the stage where England was likely to become involved in it. 
Thornton now replied to Fish; "It is impossible to connect due
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question of Canadian independence with the Alabama claims."49
By October the international situation had taken a new turn 
once more. Russia had taken advantage of the general disturbances 
in Europe to renounce a provision of the Treaty of 1856 which had 
been forced upon her and which excluded warships from the Black 
Sea. England denied the right of Russia to repudiate the treaty 
and a menace of war existed for a month or more.
In view of these international complications, Lord Granville's 
point was well taken, when, later, he was defending the settlement 
with the United States before the house of Lords. He said that it 
was necessary to look at international relations of Great Britain 
from a new standpoint, and added that it was impossible to say 
that the British relations with the United States were on a satis­
factory footing.50
During November when the tension in European affairs was high­
est, the Russian minister in Washington suggested to Fish that the 
time was most opportune to press the Alabama claims. Fish had al­
ready come to the same decision. He had, however, made changes in 
his policy. He realized the futility of further negotiations on 
the basis of Canadian independence. While he knew that a settle­
ment on any other basis would be opposed by Sumner, Fish decided to 
deoena upon the President's animosity towards the Senator to assure 
the necessary support.
On November 20, 1870, Fish had an interview with Thornton 
in which he alluded to the suggestion of the Russian minister. 
Thornton then asked what the United States wanted. Eish replied 
that this government asked merely an expression oi regret on the
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part of Great Britain, an acceptable declaration of principles of
51international law, and payment of claims. 'fixis was a great con­
cession on the part of Fish, and he proposed to have the negotia­
tions on his terms. The time was propitious, and the President's 
message to Congress made recommendations which might prove em­
barrassing to Great Britain.
The -^resident and his adviser had evidently decided that the
government would not allow the pressing need of private claimants
to operate in any degree upon public opinion in the United States
so as to create a demand for settlement with England on any basis
52below that which the national dignity required. He said in the 
message:
"I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached for 
the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain grow­
ing out of the course adopted by that Government during the 
rebellion. The cabinet of London, so far as its views have 
been expressed, does not appear to be willing to concede 
that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence 
or did or permitted any act by which the United States has 
just cause of complaint. Our firm and unalterable convic­
tions are directly the reverse. I therefore recommend to 
Congress to authorize the appointment of a commission to 
take proof of the amount and ownership of these several 
claims, on notice to the representative of Her Majesty at 
Washington, and that the authority be given for the settle­
ment of these claims by the United States, so that the Gov­
ernment shall have ownership of the private claims as well 
as the responsible control of all the demands against Great 
Britain. It cannot be necessary to add that whenever Her 
Majesty's Government shall entertain a desire for a full and 
friendly adjustment of these claims the United States will 
enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a 
conclusioggconsistent with the honor and dignity of both 
nations."
This veiled threat occasioned indignation in Great Britain 
and the London Times declared his tone menacing. It asserted that 
Grant's tone held out no hope for a friendly settlement. It was
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thought in some quarters that the words were designed for political 
3ffect at home, but the message came at the psychological moment 
to induce Great Britain to act. It was realized in that country 
that the.Grant administration had no desire to push the settlement 
o f the Alabama question. Grant wrote to Badeau: "It is not half 
so important that the Alabama Claims should be settled as it is 
that when they are settled it sliould be in terms creditable to 
this nation. I do not see that any harm is to arise from the mat­
ter standing in an unsettled state.
During the latter part of 1870 the administration attempted 
to distract attention from domestic affairs by turning to foreign 
affairs. Ben Butler demanded that the government take a bold 
stand with Great Britain. He demanded that a portion of Canada 
be ceded in settlement of the Alabama claims.^5
In December 1870 the breach between Grant and Sumner became 
wider. Attempts were made by leaders of the administration to 
bring about a reconciliation between the two. The President 
manifested a good desl of hard feeling and refused to be pursuaded 
that their differences could be reconciled. Grant charged that 
Sumner had attacked him in executive session of the Senate and 
that Sumner had attributed dishonest motives to him. Sumner de­
nied all these charges publicly, and said that the president 
had threatened to take him personally to account. ^
The renewal of the San Domingo controversy gave Sumner an 
opportunity to arouse the administration still further against 
him. The President had requested in his message that a joint 
resolution be introduced to bring about the annexation of the is­
land. During the summer Grant had strengthened his hold on those
8 4 4 0 ^
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who had supported him, and at the same time! had manifested an 
intense personal bitterness toward Sumner, vrhom he held chiefly 
responsible for the failure of the treaty. Sumner had conceived 
a cordial contempt for Grant which was a matter of general know­
ledge. HVhen the San Domingo question was again brought forward,
a clash of greater proportions than before was expected, and duly 
57came. A Joint resolution for annexation was further than even 
the most ardent supporters of the President were willing to go. 
Instead a resolution was introduced to appoint a commission to 
investigate conditions on the island. Morton, who sponsored this 
resolution, assured Sumner that this was only a wqy of dropping 
the matter in a manner which would not be discourteous to the 
President. Sumner was not convinced that this was so, and in­
stead of letting the matter pass without remark and so close the 
issue, he opened the debate by saying, "The resolution before 
the Senate commits Congress to a dance of blood." In a violent 
speech he uttered most offensive imputations against the President 
and his advisers. He said the president had usurped the powers 
of Congress, and had committed an act of war without its consent. 
He Intimated that Grant was following the footsteps of Pierce, 
Buchanan, and Johnson. He compared the murderer president Saget 
of San Domingo in a favorable light with Grant. He called the 
whole scheme the purchase of a bloody lawsuit. He went on to 
charge that attempts had been made to change the membership of 
the Committee for Foreign Affairs when it was felt that the 
scheme would not pass.^® Morton made a dignified reply. He de­
fended the President and the administration. He accused Sumner 
of taking this opportunity to attack the President. Morton main-
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tained that the treaty was dead and the need for discussing*it
did not exist. Chandler made personal attacks on Sumner. Chandler
demanded he name the persons who had divulged the secrets of the
caucus to which Sumner had referred. Conkling threatened Sumner
with party discipline. He said:
"The Committee on Foreign Relations should not be composed of* those who have added insult to injury, and arrayed them­
selves not only in opposition to the Administration, but 
so arrayed themselves in manner and substance as to make it 
impossible for the Administration to confer with all the committees of this body."59
The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 32 to 9, 30 members 
being absent from the chamber. The bill was sent to the House 
where it was passed only after an amendment was added which dis­
tinctly provided that the appointment of the commission should 
not in any way commit the administration to annexation.^0
The speech of Sumner on this occasion was not approved by 
Sumner's friends. It had diverted the attention from the issue of 
annexation to that of the personal animosity between the Senator 
and the President. The people of the country still strongly sym­
pathized with Grant and it was Impossible for the oratory of Sum-
61ner to swing their sympathies from the military hero.
On January 9, 28*71 Rose was again at Washington. Ostensibly - 
he came on private business, but in reality he had authority to 
open informal negotiations for an immediate settlement. Granville, 
who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to 
Bright:
"I have sent Sir John Rose to New York and Washington to 
do that which is difficult for Thornton without committing 
us. .....He is to ascertain from the Government and from 
the opposition what chance there is of our simultaneously 
agreeing to some beginning of a negotiation, if it were 
only to assent to a joint commission, who, without being 
commissioned to settle anything, migh", arrange in what
manner each Question in discussion might be best consider- ' ed. " 6 2
On the evening when Rose arrived at Washington, he dined with 
Fish and Bancroft Davis. Davis kept an account of the interview 
which took place. Rose stated that he had baen requested by the 
British government to ascertain what could be done for settling 
the pending questions between the two governments. He said he 
was authorized to say that the British government would be willing 
to refer the subject to a joint commission, Lf such a plan would 
be acceptable to the United States. Fish replied that before 
agreeing to go into such a commission, there should be certainty 
of success. He asked whether the British government would be pre­
pared to admit a liability for what were known as the Alabama 
claims. Rose replied that such a concession would not be made.
He said that while he thought that the British government would 
be found liable for the damages committed by the Alabama, the 
cases of the other vessels would be doubtful. He said the British 
government was willing to submit to arbitration either to contin­
ental jurists, or to any other tribunal that the two governments 
might agree upon. He added that Parliament would not support any 
government which would admit the liability for the acts of the 
Alabama. Fish replied that the Senate would not ratify a treaty 
which did not recognize that liability. Most of the Senators had 
opposed the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, and the changes in the 
personnel of the Senate due to the recent elections would not be 
enough to secure the ratification of a new treaty on the same 
basis. Rose urged that if a commission once met, they would not 
part without coming to some settlement. Fish insisted that the
admission of liability as to the Alabama was necessary. He said 
he^  did not ask England to humiliate herself, but that she should
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feel that, due to the neglect of a local offlcer7'^hl^ ^ « ^^lSihadl | 
been allowed to escape and the government sc became liable. This 
admission with an expression of regret for what had taken place 
to disturb the relations of the two countries would be sufficient 
as a preliminary. Rose said that England could not take the ini­
tiative in the question of the Alabama claims. He suggested that, 
if the way for settlement seemed clear, the British government 
should propose a commission for the settlement of the San Juan 
boundary, the fisheries, and other Canadian questions. The United 
States could then accede to the proposal provided that the claims 
for the acts of the vessels should be also considered.^
After this interview Sir John Rose prepared a paper in which 
he made certain observations and recommendations which became 
the basis for the negotiations. First, the commissioners should 
provide protocols or treaties by means of which a full and final 
adjustment might take place. Second, the preamble should express 
the desire of Her Majesty to put an end to all differences and to 
lay the foundation of lasting bonds of amity between the two 
countries. Third, the sending of High Commissioners to Washington 
would be accepted as a friendly advance, and the terms made 
through such a body would be more likely to be acceptable than 
any arranged through ordinary diplomatic channels. The commis­
sioners should not decide questions themselves, but merely arrange 
the machinery of doing so. Fourth, the commissioners would be 
subject to daily instruction from their governments, and mutual 
concessions could be made as the need arose. Fifth, it would be 
desirable to have the opinion of the Senate before it adjourned, 
so it was highly desirable to begin the negotiations immediately.^
' added tbs' *.t "ore proceeding furpher with the 'negoti; - 
tion it would be advisable to lay the memorandum of Rose directly 
before Sumner and obtain either an approval of the new basis of 
negotiations or an outright statement of his objections. Friendly 
;relations between the Senator and the Secretary had been broken
by -further developments in the Motley affair. When Motley had
.
been asked to resign, he refused. When, in November 1870, Fish 
decided to drop all mention of Canadian independence from the ne­
gotiations, he was preparing to discount all objections which 
Sumner might raise and depend upon the President's animosity to- 
wards the Senator to insure support for his negotiations. The 
recall of Motley marked another step in that decision. When Mot­
ley attempted to defend himself and Sumner, Fish was prompted to
cover up any responsibility of the President, and the motives of
'the case. He wrote a lengthy despatch to the legation in which 
he disclaimed that there was any connection between Motley's re­
moval and the San Domingo controversy. He gave as the reason 
that Motley was misrepresenting the administration's policy. With­
out saying so, he implied that Motley represented Sumner rather 
than the President. Fish concluded with a thinly veiled accusa­
tion against Sumner of dishonesty towards the President in con-
65nection with the San Domingo Affair. Undoubtedly the San 
Domingo controversy hastened the recall of Motley, but Cox report­
ed that Grant said, "I had made up my mind to remove Motley before 
there was any quarrel with Sumner." Grant had also written to 
Badeau: "Mr. Motley's removal was long in contemplation,.... and
he was only left in England as long as he was out of deference to 
Governor Fish, who is averse to changes, or to doing anything 
which gives inconvenience to others." Fish's action in the re-
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moval of Motley and In writing the accusation to the legation 
marks definitely his decision to remain loys.l to the Administration 
at the expense of a rupture with his life-lcng friend, Sumner.
While he took the step reluctantly, he must have realized that 
his ambition to effect a settlement with England could not be ac­
complished while Sumner remained at the head of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Whether he so intended or not, the veiled in-
-
suit in his despatch paved the way for his removal from that posi­
tion.
Since the Secretary and Sumner were no longer on speaking
terms, a friend arranged for an interview on January 15* Two days
later Sumner sent this message to Fish:
"(1) The idea of Sir John Rose is that all questions and 
sources of irritation between England and the United Statesshould be removed absolutely and forever....Nothing could
be better than this initial idea. It should be the start­
ing point.
"(2) The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a con­
stant source of anxiety and disturbance is from Fenianism, 
which is excited by the proximity of the Eritish flag in 
Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of the British flag 
cannot be abandoned..... " °° l
This was an ultimatum. Sumner must have realized that such
a demand, would have broken off the negotiations. It is difficult
to reconcile that demand with a previous statement of Sumner when
he said that annexation should come only by peaceful means and
69with the consent of the population. It was well known in Jan­
uary 1871 that England would not give up Canada, and that the 
population had no desire for annexation with the United States.
Fish spent a week consulting Senators of both parties and 
received assurances of support in his efforts to bring about ami­
cable settlement.7° With this assurance he continued the negotia­
tions along the lines already begun.
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On January 24 Fish again had an interview with Rose at which
time he read his answer to Rose. To show how great a concession
he was about to make, Fish showed Sumner’s message to Rose. Fish
then stated that it had been decided by this government that the
best interests of both countries demanded that, should England
agree to send out commissioners on the basis which had previously
been indicated, no effort would be spared to secure a favorable
result even if it involved a conflict with the Chairman of the
71Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate.
The accord reached after twenty months of secret diplomacy
was expressed in regular diplomatic form in four notes which pass-
72ed between Fish and Thornton.
On February 8, 1871 at the opening of Parliament the Queen 
said in her speech, "I have suggested the appointment of a Joint 
commission and I have agreed to a proposal of the President that 
this commission shall be authorized at the same time and in the 
same manner to resume the consideration of the American claims 
growing out of the circumstances of the late war.'"' D
The instructions to the commissioners directed them to dis­
cuss in a friendly spirit the various questions on which differ­
ences had arisen. The further purpose of the commission was to 
decide on a method for the settlement of the questions. The ar­
rangement was to include all claims for compensation which may
74be agreed upon by the two governments.
Commissioners were promptly appointed by both countries.
The commissioners who acted on the behalf of the United States 
were Secretary Fish, General Schenck, who had been appointed to 
succeed Motley, Justice Nelson of the Supreme Court, Judge Hoar,
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and ex-Senator Williams of Oregon. The British commissioners 
were Earl de Grey and Rlpon, Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, Sir 
Edward Thornton, minister to the United States, Sir John Mac­
donald, premier of Canada, and Montague Bernard, Professor of 
International Law at Oxford. They met in Washington on February 
27 and continued their sessions for six weeks. At the first 
meeting it was decided to keep secret the discussions and com­
municate only with their governments.
It was now made to appear that no settlement with England 
would be possible with Sumner at the head of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. Newspapers were circulating a rumor that the 
British Foreign Office had informed our minister that there could 
be no settlement of our differences with England as long as Sum-
ner remained chairman of the committee. The same opinion was
75voiced in Parliament. Fish was able to use the animosity of 
Grant toward Sumner to make the success of his treaty certain, 
and the Senator's statements in regard to the withdrawal of the 
British flag from the continent were used against him, even 
though the idea had earlier been as much Grant's as it was Sum­
ner's. When Congress met in March, 1871, it took steps necessary
to further decrease Sumner's influence. When the list of com-
.
mittee members was presented, Sumner's name lid not appear on the 
Committee on foreign Relations. Howe of Wisconsin said: "The 
personal relations existing between Sumner and the President and 
the Secretary of State are such as preclude all social inter­
course between them." jje sai£ it was deemed best that the head 
of that committee be on speaking terms with those officers in 
order to discharge his duties. Schurz denied that Sumner refused
President. He reported that Sumner had agreed to receive Fish as 
an old friend, and would be willing and glad to discuss such ques­
tions as came up for consideration. Wilson of Massachusetts said 
the reason was insufficient, for Sumner's ability was needed in 
the position. He felt there was no need to have social inter­
course in order to transact business. Edmunds declared thst the. 
question was whether the Senate and the Republican party were 
ready to sacrifice their sense of duty to the whims of one single 
man. To him the transaction was merely a business affair of 
changing a member from one committee to another to suit the conven 
ience of the Senate. Steward said the President had a right to 
expect respect in the committees, and he thought that business 
could be better transacted if the change were made. Schurz blamed 
the President for the action of the caucus, and criticized him 
for using pressure on the senators to make the change. Morton, 
the party leader, insisted that the vote of the caucus be abided 
by and charged that it was the duty of every republican to sup­
port it.^ The Administration could take no chances of having 
the negotiations on the treaty fail, since the successes had not 
been as great as might have been expected.
Even though Sumner was removed from the committee, the com­
missioners were anxious in regard to the attitude he would take. 
They paid him a good deal of attention. Northcote wrote:
"We remain here.... because they (the government) think 
we may be able to influence particular senators, such as 
the Democrats and still more Sumner, over whom they have 
no party control. I had a long talk with Sumner yester­
day.... he is very cautious, but I do not think him un­
friendly. He is very anxious to stand well with England; 
but, on the other hand, he would dearly like to have a 
slap at Grant. We have paid him a great deal of atten­
tion since he has been deposed, and I think he is much
93
pleased at being still recognized as a power. He certainly 
is one, for, though I think the Government could beat him in the Senate, he could stir up a great deal of bad feel­
ing in the country.
Sumner's position was described by Henry Adams, as follows:
"If he resists and fails, he is done for. If he resists and suc­
ceeds, he will break himself down here. If he accedes and votes 
for the treaty, Grant drags him in triumph at his chariot wheels.
That the treaty had a deep political significance is shown 
by a letter from Sickles to Chandler in which he said: "if Grant 
settles the English question satisfactorily, it will save his 
foreign policy, and if he wipes out the Ku Klux his record, in­
cluding the excellent treasury exhibit, will carry him through 
safely."80
Sir Stafford Northcote observed that the re-election of Grant 
appeared to depend much upon the successful conduct of the Com­
mission on the part of the Americans. He said that the American 
government wanted as great a triumph as possible and as conspic­
uous a defeat of England as would be possible without the dis-
8Xturbance and discomfort of actual hostilities.
On May 10 the treaty was sent to the Senate and at once re­
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. When it was report­
ed out, Sumner made the principal speech in which he discussed 
fully the respects in which this treaty met the objections which 
had been raised to the rejected Johnson-Clarendon Convention. He 
moved some amendments, but did not press them. On May 24 the treal 
was ratified by the Senate by a vote of fifty to twelve, Sumner 
voting with the majority. The twelve who opposed the treaty were 
10 Democrats and 2 Republicans, which bears out the fact that the
treaty was accepted as a party measure.82
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Chapter IV.
EXPRESSION OP PUBLIC OPINION
The available evidence supports the conclusion that the 
Senate regarded the Treaty of 7/ashington with favor* amendments 
were made in executive session to change some articles and to aau 
others, but each proposal was rejected by a decisive vote* Vickers 
proposed an amendment which would allow the building of ships of 
war and manufacturing munitions for the purpose of selling them to 
belligerents* The amendment would also have permittee the right 
to asylum and hospitality to armed belligerent vessels which en­
tered ports* Such a proposal would have destroyed any value which 
the treaty possessed as a means of preserving peace* The proposal 
was rejectee without calling for the yeas and nays, which shows an 
earnest desire on the j^ art of the Senate as a whole to establish 
cordial relations with Great Britain* Sumner proposed a series of 
amendments to bring about certain results he deemed important* 
First, he desired the security of private property at sea, not in­
cluding contraband of war, and, second, the abolition of commercial 
blockades. He next asked for the denial of a national or belliger­
ent character to vessels not holding a commission given at a port 
in the actual occupation of the commissioning government, ana the 
treatment as pirates of vessels employed in burning prizes at sea* 
lastly he contended for the use of a more definite term than 'due 
diligence' in the statement of the duty of neutral powers to pre­
vent the fitting out of ships in their ports to aid a belligerent* 
These amendments were all rejected as the Senate thought that it
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would not be prudent to open negotiations anew, and the treaty was 
ratified without change*^
When the Queen's speech was delivered to Parliament on Feb­
ruary 9, 1671, it announced the appointment of the joint commission 
to devise a method of settling existing differences between the 
United States and Great Britain, The general opinion in both 
houses was decidedly in favor of some form of settlement* lisraeli 
pointed out the complicated state of affairs in Europe and said 
that there were .possible dangers which had arisen by the Franco- 
Prussian War* The balance of power on the continent had been des­
troyed, and it was realized that friendly relations with the United 
States would help to create a new balane of power. While Lisraeli 
favored immediate settlement with the United States, he thought 
that a hostile attitude was assumed by that government when it ad­
dressed Russia or Prussia. He thought the President's message was 
neither friendly nor respectful. He then referred to what he called 
an electioneering game in America in which animosity toward England 
was stirred up to attract the Irish vote* He thought that the 
"rowdy rhetoric which is addressed to irresponsible millions" which 
was used to excite poxitical passions by abusing England would
2cease if England would maintain a more adequate army ana navy.
The successful conclusion of the negotiations brought a sen­
sation of relief in England as well as in the United States. Moran 
wrote that there was a wide spread feeling that the treaty would be 
a measure to close all sources of dispute between the two countries 
He added that there would be some opposition to the treaty on the 
part of lord Russell, but that his opposition would be on personal
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grounds rather than on a matter of principle. Moran added that
nothing Russell could say would prevent the acceptance of the
3treaty in England*1
The treaty consisted of forty-three articles, the first 
eleven of which dealt with the settlement of the Alabama claims.
It provided that the claims be referred to a tribunal of five ar­
bitrators who were to meet in Genev- * Each of the parties was to 
prepare its case and other evidence, and four months later each 
party was to present a counter case and any additional evidence.
In deciding the matters submitted to the arbitrators, they
were to be governed by three rules which had been agreed upon by
the joint high commissioners:
"A neutral Government is bound--
"First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, 
arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel 
which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to..... 
carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and 
also to use lire diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war 
as above.......
"Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to 
make use of its port© or waters as the base of naval opera­
tions against the other.........
"Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and 
waters....... to prevent any violation of the foregoing obli­
gations and duties."4
A very important part of the treaty was Artisle i, in which 
Great Britain e/pressea "in friendly spirit, the regret felt by 
Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circum­
stances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and 
for the depredations committed by those vessels.
On June ll, 1871 Russell in the House of lords moved tnat 
the treaty be not sanctioned* He haa changed his opinion very de­
cidedly since 1665. In 1871 he said that he had no objections to
offer to the appointment of arbitrators, or even to asking the ar­
bitrators whether he was justified in not detaining the Alabama 
while he had waited for a decision from the law officers* Hie 
greatest objection was to the three rules which he regarded as an 
ex post facto law. He thought the first rule would render Great 
Britain liable for the escape of the vessels* The duty of neutrals 
he thought should be confined to the obligation of preventing an 
armed vessel from leaving a port to make war on a friendly nation, 
it looked to him he saia like paying a tribute to buy peace* He
remarked further, "There is no saying to what extent these rules
6will make us liable." He pointed out that a vessel might leave a 
port with 'the secret intention of making war against a friendly 
power, and that the rules would hold the government liable even 
though they had use^ due diligence as far as they possibly could.
His objections were increased by the fact that the British commis­
sioners had ignoreu the claims which Canada made against the United 
States. He thought the British commissioners had yieideu to the dej 
manas of the American commissioners too easily. He said:
"Everything has been concession on our sine, and assertion.... 
without argument on the part of the United States. Our com­
missioners did not trouble the imerioan commissioners to go 
into any argument; they merely....accepted the assertion that 
they could not entertain the question of compensating the 
Canadians for the Fenian outrages....So to with regard to 
the Fisheries."
In defense of the treaty lord Granville saia that no admis­
sion of liability because of negligence haa oeen m&ue. in regard 
to the claims which Canada mace, he said that they were taxen care 
of to the satisfaction of the Canadian representative on the com­
mission, and that claims for the Fenian raids had not been insisted
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upon because it was known that they would not be allowed by the 
American commissioners* It was thought better to yield that point 
than to destroy the fruits of the entire negotiations, but he 
added that the Fenian claims had been by no means abandoned, lord 
Granville said he thought the treaty was decidedly in favor of 
Great Britain since so many of the claims against Great Britain had 
already been settled. The great concession on the part of the 
United States was the withdrawal of the indirect claims, lord 
Granville said: "They entirely disappear under the limited reference 
....which includes merely complaints arising out of the escape of 
the Alabama."^ It was the desire of the commission he said to pro­
vide rules for the future. In his opinion a great advantage would 
aacrue to Great Britain by having the Unitea States agree to abide 
by the three rules. He said they were no more stringent than their 
own Foreign Enlistment Act since it was amended. He concluded:
"I defy any one to say there is any country which has a 
greater interest than we have in escaping such depredations 
as were committed by the Alabama. We have agreeu to prin­
ciples which we think are just and right.... and we have
agreeu that our subsequent legislation shall be judged by 
them.
Earl de Grey also considered that the government had accom­
plished a signal benefit in binding the American government by rules
which were just and reasonable in tnemselves, and from which England
10herself would derive much benefit in the event of future wars, 
lord Cairns saw great merit in the expression of sorrow for the 
acts committed. He said the treaty was binding upon the country 
even though ratifications had not yet b en exchanged. The three 
rules he felt were important guides for future conduct.11 The Earl 
of Kimberly saw great advantages for Canada in the agreement maae in1
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regard to the fisheries. Earl Derby thought that the treaty was
a poor one, but that it should be accepted as an accomplished fact.
He said that the expression of regret might prejudice the British
13case before the arbitrators.
On the other hand, Earl Carnarvon thought that the treaty was 
a bad bargain. He thought the claims for the Fenian raids should 
have been included in tne arbitration to balance the Alabama 
claims.14 She Marquess of Salisbury thought the treaty gave Great 
Britain nothing but "the advantage of calming the susceptibilities 
of the American people. The Duke of Argyll, however, said that
the advantages gained by the acknowledgement of the three great 
rules of international law for the future would off-set any conces­
sions th ..t were made.16 After the debate Lora Bussell's motion was
17defeated by an almost unanimous vote.
On August 4 the merits of the treaty were debated in the 
House of Commons when Sir Sharles Adderley moved to lay the corres­
pondence before the House. He repeated the same objections to the 
treaty which had been made in the House of Lords previously, but be
closed his speech by expressing a hope that the general result would
16be favorable to good will, peace, ana international cordiality*
• Sir. r!oundell Palmer, who was a member of the cabinet, when Adams was building up his case, 
defended the treaty by saying th. t tne most satisfactory part of it
was that which set down rules for the future and allowed them to be
applied as rules to judge the past. ne said that it was not admitted
that the government had actually failed to perform its public dutj/.
Whatever might be the imperfections of the treaty, he felt that if
it resulted in permanent peace and good will, he would be willing
to pay any amount which could be assessed against England as a
12
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result of the treaty.
Sir Stafford Korthcote defended the work of the commission­
ers. He denied Lord Russell's contention that the British commis­
sioners had agreed to whatever was proposed by the American commis­
sioners and declareu that national honor justified the treaty* The 
treaty he said excluded the question of the recognition of belli­
gerency and the indirect claims, and the rules which were set down 
would he for the benefit of peace of the whole world. He said that 
in any case where England was concerned, it ?;as important to con­
sider whether America would be friendly or hostile. He closed by 
saying:
"There never was a time when it was more desirable for the 
maintenance of the foremost position of England in the coun­
cils of Europe. ... .with respect to the maintenance of peace
....There never was a time when they (the government) had a
greater opportunity, ana at which a greater responsibility 
rested upon them than at that moment, and he firmly believed 
thut the Treaty of Washington, although it might be open to 
captious observations, and might possioly contain some real
defects, was....a great step in the promotion and toward the
attainment of that desirable end."^u
Hathbone said he knew what the feelings of the British mer­
chants -were on this matter: "That feeling was one of gratitude 
to the Government and the Commissioners for what they had done in
' O  *1effecting the Treaty." He went on to say that the opinion in 
Liverpool was that it would be utterly impossible to maintain com­
merce if Alabama could be fitted out in neutral ports. He added 
that the commissioners haa laid aside mere technicalities and had 
looked to great principles of justice and national morality.
Gladstone pointed out that the duties of neutrals were be­
coming more and more difficult, and that England's position was
especially peculiar in that respect because of the large amourt of
her foreign commerce. With Gladstone the desire to end the quarrel 
with the United States was not a consequence of the possible troubles 
with foreign nations. His view was wider and less specific. He 
realized also that the power of Great Britain in Europe was lessened 
by the bad feeling existing with the Uxiitea States, but he took a 
higher ground than this in his appreciation of the benefit to the 
world arising from an absolute reconciliation in good faith between 
the two English speaking nations. He said the great concession 
was to have consentea to go to arbitration as to whether there was 
any defect in the administration of their own municipal law, and he 
hoped that the three rules would widen into an international law 
for the benefit of the whole world.
After the debate, the motion of Sir Charles Adaerley was 
withdrawn.
The work of the tribunal seemed to be following a smooth 
course until it was learned that the formal American statement of 
the case put before the arbitrators included not only losses suf­
fered by individual citizens, but also the indirect and national 
claims were included in the final chapter of the American case, 
which had not been sent in for criticism by Fish and Hoar as had 
the other chapters. The American counsel maintained that by the 
language of the treaty, those claims were legitimately included, 
while the British government took the opposite view and stood firm­
ly upon their position.
There was a general feeling of alarm and surprise in England 
to find that the indirect claims were again brought forward* The 
press and menbers of Parliament immediately demanded that either 
these claims be repudiated or England would withdraw from the
lOfi
convention. The Queen's speech on February 3, 1872 announced that 
the indirect claims were not within the province of the arbitrators. 
Gladstone was in favor of breaking off the arbitration rather than 
to agree to submit the indirect claims to arbitration. Disraeli 
spoke of the indirect claims as preposterous and wild, Gladstone 
thought that this was rather an understatement than an exaggeration 
and went on to say, "We must be insane to accede to demands which 
no nation with a spark of honour or spirit left could submit even 
at the point of death."'" lord De la Warr declared in the debate 
that the indirect claims were utterly inadmissable and could not 
for a moment be entertained, lord Granville referred to a previous 
statement in which he said, "They (the indirect claims) entirely 
disappear under the limited reference... which includes merely 
complaints arising out of the escape of the Alabama,"^ low he 
said he trusted he should be able to show by reference to the word­
ing of the treaty, to the statements of the commissioners, ano. to 
the correspondence, that both governments felt that these claims 
were excluded by the words of the treaty. 6^
On the same day in the House of Commons, Disraeli said that 
he had always been in favor of maintaining friendly relations with 
the Unite- States. He thought that the indirect claims demanded a 
tribute greater than could be exacted by conquest. He said, "V.e
cannot, in justice to ourselves....consent to propositions too
enormous for practical purposes....which, if persisted in, can only 
lead "do an alienation of feelings.
Those who had opposed the treaty accused the government of 
acceding to an instrument in which the indirect claims could be 
legitimately produced and sustained* Gladstone declared that the
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interpretation put upon the treaty by the British government was 
the true ariG unambiguous meaning of the words, and not one of sever­
al conflicting meanings which coulu be attached to the treaty. He 
said that the indirect claims were excluded by any test of the 
treaty, whether it be by grammar, by reason, by poJicy, or by any 
other standard* He expressed his hope that friendly relations 
coula be restored, ana he hoped to make it as easy as possible for 
the Unitea States to meet their demand. He was clearly disappointed 
that the United States had again advanced the indirect claims alter 
Greet Britain haa made such extensive concession. He said, ",Ye 
are determined to stretch to the utmost all considerations which 
are capable of such a process; that everything except national honor 
and national safety would be risked for the object we prise so 
dearly— namely the re-establishment of cordial relations with the 
United States.
The differences as to whether the indirect claims were inclua- 
ed was the result of a misunderstanding. all members of the British 
cabinet accepted the vie. that if a direct repudiation of those
.claims had been insisted Upon by the British Commissioners, no 
treaty would have been tossible. Both sides in the Washington con­
ference hiid been more anxious to submit the claims to the arbitra­
tors rather than to settle the principle involved themselves • The 
American commissioners knew their position to be unsound, but they 
also knew that their own people expected the claims to be referred, 
it would have been unpolitic to waive them entirely. The British 
commissioners were willing to waive an express renunciation of them, 
being confident that the terms of the protocols and the language of
the treaty would be so construed by the arbitrators to exclude the
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indirect claims. 2he cabinet agreed that a virtual waiver of the 
claims was to be found both in the protocols ana in the treaty.
Lord Ripon and Forster thought it would be safe to go on at Geneva 
in the assurance that the arbitrators v.oula be certain to rule the
OOindirect claims out.
The difficulty of the government of the United States in deal­
ing with the Alabama claims was not uue to any faith in their 
soundness but to the difficulty in getting rid of them. Fish haa 
written to Schenck on April S3, 1672 that the United States would 
at any time have waived the indirect claims for any equivalent, or 
in connection with any settlement, had they been askea so to do 
during the negotiation of the treaty. Fish also told Adams that 
he was willing to have the indirect claims decided adversely, but 
tnat he thought they ought >>0 be disposed in one way or another. 
Through the gooa offices of adams the tribunal made an extrajudicial
statement which excluded the indirect claims from further consiaer- 
29ation.
In May 1673 after the tribunal had mate the award, the 
treaty came up for discussion during a debate on the supply report. 
Betinck criticized the government violently. He said that the 
government hac followed an unconstitutional course by not submit­
ting the treaty to Parliament for ratification after it haa been 
accepted by the cabinet. Gregory, who haa been a partisan of the 
South during the Civil War, said the House of Commons should enter 
a protest against the principles on which the treaty was based*
All the previous arguments were advanced, but no new or significant 
point was raised. Clearly it was a move against the ministry since
the payment of the award on the part of Great Britain was a fore­
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gone conclusion. Gladstone defended his government and the treaty. 
He said that the three rules were already a part of international 
law at the time the claims arose, and maintained that the municipal 
law covered the same points. He declared that those rules had 
played no part in the decision of the tribunal. Of the treaty in 
general he had this to say:
"Any amount of disappointment we may feel at the result is 
but a considerable deduction for the satisfaction attendant 
upon such an arrangement which removes such causes of differ­
ence between two great countries lixe England and America, 
and does so much,....for mankind at large by the example it 
sets for a peaceful settlement of disputes as a substitute 
for the bloody arbitrament of war.
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Appendix A
Queen’s Proclamation of Neutrality
" ..whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the 
Government of the United States of America and certain States styl­
ing themselves the Confederate States of America;
"And whereas we, being at peace with the Government of the 
United States, have declared our royal determination to maintain a 
strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said 
contending parties;
" We therefore have thought fit....to issue this....proclama­
tion.
"......it is, among other things, declared... as follows:"That if any natural-born subject of His Majesty....shall
take or accept....any military commission or shall otherwise enter
into military service.....in any warlike or military operation in
the service of.....any foreign prince, state, potentate,........
or of any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the 
powers of government in ...any foreign country....; or if any nat­
ural-born subject.... shall.....agree to enlist or enter himself
to serve as sailor or marine, or to be employed......on board any
ship..... intended to be used for any warlike purpose..... ; or if
any natural-born subject.... shall.... go.... to any foreign state.... with the intent to serve in any warlike or military operation;
or if any person whatever, within the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland shall hire, retain, engage, or procure, or 
shall attempt to hire, retain, engage, or procure, any person...
to enlist or to enter..... in any such service or employments asaforesaid.......; in any or either of such cases, every person
so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
being convicted thereof, upon any information or indictment, shall 
be punished by fine and imprisonment, or either of them, at the 
discretion of the court before which such offender shall be con­
victed."And it is ....further enacted:
"That if any person.....shall..... equip, furnish, fit
out, or arm,..... or be concerned in the equipping, furnishing,
fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent... that 
such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any ....foreign state.... or of any persons exercising or assuming to
exercise any powers of government in....any foreign state....as a 
transport of store-ship, or with Intent to cruise or commit hos­
tilities against any...state, or against the persons exercising
or assuming to exercise the powers of government in any ....part
of any.... country, with whom His Majesty shall not then be at war, 
or shall, upon conviction thereof upon any information or indict­
ment, be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of them,.....; and every such ship or vesset.....together with all the
materials, arms, ammunition, and stores......shall be forfeited;
and it shall be lawful for any officer of His Majesty's customs 
or excise, or any officer of His Majesty's navy to seize such 
shins and vessels— ..under the laws of customs and excise, or under the laws of tra.de and navigation; and that every such ship and vessel....may be orosecuted and condemned... in such courts
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for any breach of the laws made for the protection of the reven­
ues of customs and excise, or of the laws of trade and naviga­
tion.
"And it is....... further enacted:
"Chat if any person.....shall.... increase or augment..]
the warlike force of any ship or vessel of war, ...... every such
person so offendin; shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall, upon being convicted thereof.... be punishable by fine
and imprisonment, or either of them........
"ITow in order that none of our subjects may unwarily 
render themselves liable to the penalties imposed by the said
statute, we do hereby strictly command, that no person.....do
commit any act....contrary to the provisions of the said statute,
upon pain of the several penalties...., and of our high displeasure.
"And we do hereby further warn .... our....subjects.....
that if any of them shall presume.....to do any acts in deroga­
tion of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign in the said
contest..... all persons so offending will incur and be liable to
the several penalties and penal consequences by the said statute
or by the law of nations........"And we do hereby declare, that all our subjects.....
who may misconduct themselves....will do so at their peril....
and they will in nowise obtain any protection from us against 
any liabilities or displeasure by such misconduct."
'^ 'Papers Relating to the 
Washington, 1873, Vol.
Treaty of Washington,
I., o. 215-218.
42 Cong., 3rd Sess.,
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APPENDIX B
Our Claims On England
Speech of Charles Sumner in Executive Session of the
Senate, April 13, 1869, on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty 
for the settlement of Claims,
”.... In the interest of peace, which everyone should have
at heart, the treaty must he rejected. A treaty which, instead 
of removing an existing grievance, leaves it for heartburning 
and rancor, cannot be considered a settlement of pending ques­
tions between two nations. It may seem to settle them, 'but does 
not. It is nothing but a snare. And such is the character of 
the treaty now before us. The massive grievance under which our 
country suffered for years is left untouched; the painful sense 
of wrong planted in the national heart is allowed to remain. For 
all this there is not one word of regret or even of recognition; 
nor is there any semblance of compensation.............
The Case Against England
"Close upon the outbreak of our troubles, just one month 
after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, when the rebellion was still 
undeveloped when the National Government was beginning those 
gigantic efforts which ended so triumphantly, the country was 
startled by the news that the British Government had intervened 
by a proclamation, which accorded belligerent rights to the re­
bels. At the early date when this was done the rebels were, as 
they remained to the close, without ships on the ocean, without 
Prize Courts or other tribunals for the administration of justice 
on the ocean, without any of those conditions which are the es­
sential prerequisites to such a concession.... In the swiftness
of this bestowal there was very little consideration for a 
friendly Power; nor does it appear that there was any inquiry 
into those conditions precedent on which it must depend. Ocean 
belligerency being a 'fact' and not a 'principle1 can be recog­
nized only on evidence showing its actual existence.......
"Unfriendly in the precipitancy with which it was launched, 
this concession was more unfriendly in substance. It was the 
first stage in the depredations on our commerce. Had it not been 
made no rebel ship could have been built in England. Every step 
in her building would have been piracy. Nor could any munitions 
of war have been furnished. The direct consequence of this 
concession was to place the rebels on an equality with ourselves 
in all British markets, whether of ships or munitions of war.....
"Then came the building of the pirate ships, one after 
another.... Here beyond all question was negligence, or accord­
ing to the language of -^ ord Broughan on another occasion,1 crass 
negligence', making England justly responsible for all that en­
sued.....There was negligence in allowing the building to pro-
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oeed, negligence in allowing the escape from Liverpool, and 
negligence in allowing the final escape from the British coast....
"The enlistment of the crew was not less obnoxious to cen­
sure than the building of the ship and her escape....The dedica­
tion of the ship to the rebel service.....made her departure as 
much a hostile expedition, as if she had sailed forth from her 
Majesty s dock-yard. At a moment of profound peace, between the 
United States and England, there was a hostile"expedition against 
the United States. It was in no sense a commercial transaction, but an act of war.......
"...... Thus at three different stages, the British Gov­
ernment is compromised, first in the concession of ocean bellig­
erency, on which all depended; secondly in the negligence v/hich 
allowed the evasion of the ships in order to enter upon the hos­
tile expedition for which she was built, manned, armed, and 
rquipped; and, thirdly, in the open complicity, which, after this 
evasion, gave her welcome hospitality and supplies in British 
ports..... To England must be traced also all the widespread con­
sequences which ensued........"
Reparations from England
"At last the rebellion succumbed. British ships and British 
supplies had done their work, but they failed. And now the day 
of reckoning has come; but with little apparent sense of what is 
due on the part of England. Without one soothing word for a 
friendly £ower deeply aggrieved, without a single word of regret 
England simply proposes to submit the question of liability for 
'individual*losses' to an anamalous tribunal, where chance plays
its part..... Nothing is admitted even on this question; no rule
for the future is established; while nothing is said of the in­
dignity to the nation, nor of the damages to the nation.......
The Extent of Our losses
"Individual losses may be estimated with reasonable accuracy. 
Ships burned or sunk with their cargoes may be counted and their 
value determined; but this leaves without recognition the vaster 
damage to commerce driven from the ocean, and that other damage, 
immense and infinite, caused by the prolongation of the war, all of which may be called national in contradistinction to
individual. a 3 , . ,"Our national losses have been frankly conceded by eminent 
Englishmen. (Sumner quoting Mr. Gobden) 'You have been', said^ 
he^ 'carrying on war from these shores with the United States, 
and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country 
greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is 
esstimated that the loss sustained by the capture and burning of 
American vessels has been about $15,000,000,........But this
is a small uart of the injury which has been inflicted on the 
American marine. We have rendered the rest of her vast mercan­
tile property useless.'............
l i e
"...... The loss may be seen in various circximstances, as in
the rise of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the 
carrying trade, which was one of the great resources of our 
country; the diminution of our tonnage with the corresponding 
increase of British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and 
imports, with due allowance for our abnormal currency and thediversion of war...............
"Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was 
a further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this 
branch of industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at
five per cent, annually,.......
"These (losses) are large enough; but there is another 
chapter, where they are larger far. i refer, of course, to the 
national losses caused by the prolongation of the war and trace­
able directly to England.......  Hot weeks or months, but years
were added.... to our war...........
"The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; 
but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in 
money. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four 
thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been 
already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national 
debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, 
the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as can­
not be doubted, then is England Justly responsible for the ad­
ditional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and, what­
ever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such 
must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple 
equity of the case.
Conclusion
"If the case against England is strong, and if our claims 
against England are unprecedented in magnitude, it is only be­
cause the conduct of this Power at a trying period was most un­
friendly, and the injurious consequences of this conduct were 
on a scale corresponding to the theater of action. Life and 
property were both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated 
sense of enormous wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged, 
which is one of the chief factors in the problem now presented
to the statesmen of both countries....."There are many among us who, taking counsel of a sense of 
national wrong, would leave them to rest without settlement, so 
as to furnish a precedent for retaliation in kind, should Eng­
land find herself at war.... It is not difficult to imagine one
of our countrymen saying with Shakespear's Jew, 'The villainy 
you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard, but I will 
better the instruction;' nor is it difficult to imagine an Eng­
lishman firm in his conceit, that no apology can oe made and 
nothing paid......... "
■^ Cong. Globe, 41 Gong. , 1st Sess.,
p. 20-26.
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APPENDIX C
Sumner's Arraignment of the President in His 
Speech on San Domingo
"In Great Britain the exclusive prerogative of making 
treaties is in the Crown, and so in most other countries it is 
in the executive; but I need not remind you that in our country 
it is otherwise. The exclusive prerogative here is not in the 
Executive; it is in the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and until that advice and consent have 
been given he can exercise no power under that treaty. Those 
waters were as sacred as the waters about France and England.
He might as well have penetrated the ports of either of~those 
countries and launched his menace there as have penetrated the 
waters of this weak Power and launched his menace.
"I have called it an act of war— war, sir, made by the 
Executive without the consent of Congress.........
"If Congress had declared war against this feeble republic, 
then it would have been the part of the Executive to carry that 
declaration into effect; but until then what right had our Exe­
cutive to do this thing? None which can be vindicated by the 
laws of our country, none except what is found in the law of force.
"This outrage by our Navy upon a sister republic is aggrava­
ted by the issue which the President of the United States in his 
annual message has directly made with the President of Hayti—
mark my words--with the president of Hayti......... And now,
sir, listen to what the president of Hayti in this annual 
message says of the project of annexation, and then in one 
moment listen to the issue which the President of the United
States has joined with this president...... "The project of
annexation of the Dominican part has been rejected by the Ameri­
can Senate. The anxieties which this annexation caused to 
spring up have been dissipated before the good sense and the 
wisdom of the Senate at Washington. '"Of course the President of the United States was intimate 
with this documsnt. He could not have undertaken to launch 
his bolt against this feeble republic without knowing at least 
what their^president had said. I will not do him wrong to supDOse him ignorant, His Secretary of State must have inform­
ed him. He must have known the precise words that President 
Saget had employed when he said that the anxieties caused by 
this annexation were dissipated before the good sense and wis­
dom of the Senate at Washington. Our President joins issue with 
President Saget; he says that the rejection of the treaty was 
a’follyl There you have it. The president of one republic 
calls the rejection an act of ’good sense and wisdom ; t..e 
President of the United States calls it an act of 'folly.’ Am 
I wrong? Let me read from the message of our President: 
large commercial city will spring up, to which we will be tribu- 
tarP without receiving corresponding benefits, and then will be
seen the folly of our rejecting so great a prize.1
"There you have it. President Saget and President Grant; 
President Grant speaking with the voice of forty million, and’ 
this other president who has only eight hundred thousand peoole, all black.
"If the President of the United States had contented him­
self with thus Joining issue with the president of Hayti I 
should have left the two face to face; but not content with 
making this issue, the President of the United States proceeds 
to menace the independence of Hayti. Sir, the case is serious...
"History is often said to repeat itself. More or less it
does..... This whole measure of annexation, and the spirit with
which it is pressed find a parallel in the Kansas and Nebraska 
bill, and in the lecompton constitution, by which it was sought
to subjugate a distant territory to slavery.... and now we
witness the same things— violence in a distant island, as there 
was in Kansas; also the same presidential appliances; and, shall 
I add, the same menace of personal assault?
"In other days, to carry a project, a President has tried 
to change a committee. It was James Buchanan. And now we have 
been called this session to witness a similar endeavor by our 
President. He was not satisfied with the Committee on Foreign 
Relations as constituted for years. He wished a change. He 
asked first for the removal of the chairman. Somebody told him 
that this would not be convenient. He then asked for the removal 
of the Senator from Missouri, and he was told that this could 
not be done without affecting the German vote. He then called 
for the removal of my friend the Senator from New Hampshire, 
who unhappily was not a German. It was finally settled that 
this could not be done."I allude to these things reluctantly and only as part of 
the case. They illustrate the spirit we are called to encounter. 
They illustrate the extent to which the President has fallen 
into the line of bad examples."1
1. dong.’ Globe, 41 Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1871, pt. 1, 
p. 226-231.
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